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Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder:




Racing to the top of the corporate hierarchy is difficult, no matter how
qualified or capable the candidate. Producing more widgets than one's
competitors is not enough. Negotiating the political landscape of the
institution is also required. More specifically, individual corporate officers
have to be appeased, powerful interest groups have to be co-opted and
made allies, and competitors have to be undermined or eliminated. The
more bureaucratic the organization and the more opaque the promotion
process, the more important this institutional game to climbing the
corporate ladder. This Article identifies the kind of racial minorities or
racial types who are likely to play this game well and, consequently, race
to the top of the corporation.
Identifying these racial types is crucial to making corporations more
welcoming to and comfortable for racial minorities. This is because the
racial minorities at the top of the corporation ("successful racial types")
are in an institutional position to perform discrimination-ameliorative
tasks for those on the bottom. Thus, many corporate governance and
employment discrimination scholars rest some of their hope for the
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establishment of colorblind corporate cultures on the assumption that
successful racial types actively will seek out and perform antidiscriminatory
institutional work
However, there is reason to believe that the racial minorities at the top of
the corporate hierarchy will neither racially reform the corporation, nor
engage in door-opening activities, for the minorities on the bottom.
Indeed, strong incentives exist for minorities to race to the top of the
corporation and lift the ladder up behind them when they get there. This
Article sets forth the nature of these incentives, reveals how they help to
produce particular racial types, and explains why these racial types might
not have the racial commitment, or feel institutionally empowered, to lift as
they climb.
Prologue
Success within any large and bureaucratic organization is a function of
complicated micro-dynamics. Producing more widgets than one's competitors is
not enough. Negotiating the political landscape of the institution is also required.'
The more bureaucratic the organization, and the more opaque and political the
promotion process, the more important it becomes for employees to perform this
negotiation or play this institutional game. Being obsequious to and pleasing the
right superiors, cultivating appropriate sources of information, and affiliating oneself
with powerful interest groups are but a few forms the negotiation can take. This
Article is about the types of racial minorities who are most likely to succeed at
playing this political game.
Identifying these racial types is crucial to the project of making the internal
environments at large corporations more welcoming to racial minorities. This is
because we rest many of our hopes for the racial improvement of these
organizations on the successes of the first few generations of minority employees.
The notion is that minorities on the top of the corporation will help those on the
1. For two general treatments of workplace dynamics that combine an understanding of
both economic and organizational behavior theories, see generally JAMES N. BARON & DAVID M.
KREps, STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCES: FRAMEWORKS FOR GENERAL MANAGERS (1999); PAUL
MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT (1992). The
general perspective of melding conventional economics, behavioral economics, and
organizational behavior draws from the work of instititutionalists such as James March and
Oliver Williamson. See generally JAMES G. MARCH, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1988);
JEFFREY PFEFFER, MANAGING WITH POWER: POLITICS AND INFLUENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS (1992);
KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS (1995); Oliver E. Williamson, Introduction to
ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 3 (Oliver E.
Williamson ed., 1990).
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bottom. The empirical question is whether this is in fact the case. Our
preliminary examination of this issue concludes on a pessimistic note. The
types of racial minorities most likely to succeed may not be the ones most likely
to perform door-opening activities for other minorities. In other words, there is
reason to fear that the minorities who race to the top of the corporate ladder will
not "lift as they climb.
2
2. The expression originated as a slogan of the National Association of Colored
Women's clubs. See Kathleen M. Tangenberg, Linking Feminist Social Work and Feminist
Theology in Light of Faith-Based Service Initiatives, 18 AFFuA: J. WOMEN & SOC. WORK 379,
381 (2003).
The [NACW] clubs were established in 1896 to provide support to African
American women and to combat negative racial stereotypes. The slogan adopted
by NACW, "Lifting as we climb," was used to refer to the commitments of club
members to lift each other socially, economically, and spiritually as their
communities suffered the profound effects of racial discrimination.
Id. (citation omitted). It continues to have currency inside and outside the black community.
For an indication of its continued usage in the black community, see Bari al-Hakim, Letters to
the Editor: UC Regent: A Disgrace to His Race, THE DAILY CALIFORNIAN ONLINE, Jan. 18,
2001, at http://www.dailycal.org/article.php?id=4243 (last visited Oct. 22,2004) (speaking of
University of California Regent Ward Connerly) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Of Regent Connerly, al-Hakim states:
It astounds me that this man, this black man, has forgotten where he has come from.
He has completely neglected the idea that we have in our community to "lift as we
climb." Instead, he is kicking as he climbs, kicking those hot on his heels. He is a
disgrace to beneficiaries of affirmative action, and as a member of the black
community.
Id.; see also Normal K. Jenkins, Welcome to NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BLACK ACCOUNTANTS,
INC., at http://www.nabainc.org/pages/Home.jsp (last visited Oct. 22, 2004) (identifying the
Association's motto as "Lifting As We Climb") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); LIFriNG As WE CLIMB, Who We Are, at http://www.liftingasweclimb.org/aboutus.html
(last visited Oct. 22, 2004) ("Lifting As We Climb is a non profit organization dedicated to
strengthening the African American community .. ") (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Alison Bernstein, Remarks at the National Council for Research on Women's 6th
Annual Women Who Make a Difference Awards Dinner, at http://www.ncrw.org/interest/
bernsteinremarks.htm (Mar. 11, 2004) (using the expression to describe the deployment of
women's power) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); R.J. Grubb, Making Sure
the Kids Are All Right: Queerstock Producer and Ladyfest Organizer Doria Roberts Performs
at Boston GLASS to Boost Queer Youth, BAY WINDOWS ONLINE, (Feb. 20, 2003), at
http://www.baywindows.com/news/2003/02/20/ Arts/Making.Sure.The.Kids.Are.All.Right-37
5248.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2004) (reporting that queer musician Doria Roberts "lives by"
the expression: "'It's very important that wherever you're going that you take as many people
with you [as you can]. It's an important practice.' ... Recently, [Queerstock] expanded its
mission to earmark funds and promote awareness for queer youth advocacy agencies around the
country.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sue Katz, Community Gathers
for Rustin Breakfast, BAY WINDOWS ONLINE, Apr. 10, 2003, at http://www.baywindows.
com/news/2003/04/10/LocalNews/Community.Gathers.For.Rustin.Breakfast-414258.shtml (last
visited Oct. 22, 2004) (quoting a speaker at the Bayard Rustin Breakfast using the expression in
reference to what the "GLBT pioneers from communities of color" have taught activists) (on file
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In the context of that pessimistic projection, it seems appropriate to
remember Jerome Culp and Marilyn Yarborough, both of whom passed from
our midst within the past few months. Jerome and Marilyn were among the
first racial minorities to gain tenure and acquire institutional power at elite
American law schools-Duke and the University of North Carolina,
respectively. The two of us were fortunate to have known Jerome and Marilyn
as both friends and mentors. Neither one was especially fond of talking about
the barriers that they had overcome, but the few stories they told us suggested
that those successes came in the face of overwhelming barriers.
This should not surprise us. While the number of people of color on the
faculty of American law schools remains dismal, the racial representation
picture was even worse when Jerome and Marilyn entered the academy. And
so was the institutional culture of law schools: Open hostility towards
minorities was not uncommon, and more subtle forms of racial discrimination
were rampant. Jerome and Marilyn became law teachers when there were very
few courses on race and law and when minority faculty actively were
discouraged from, and disciplined for, pursuing a civil rights-oriented scholarly
agenda. Indeed, it is precisely this discouragement and discipline that helps to
explain why Richard Delgado, one of the nation's most productive and
influential critical race theorists, did not begin writing about race until after he
received tenure.
3
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, The Nature of
Women's Leadership: A Roundtable Before the Global Summit of Women 2001, at
http://www.globewomen.comlbus-net2/wisdomexchange.asp (Sept. 15, 2001) (encouraging
leaders to "[Il]ift as you climb because it is lonely at the top if you are alone") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Javier Rosado, Latino Students Success Stories: Successful
Latino Students!!, at http:I/www. coedu.usf.edu/zalaquettlls/lsjavier.html (last visited Oct. 22,
2004) ("1 am excited about what the future will bring and in all I do I will be certain to always
apply the key lesson I have learned from the Latino Scholarship: 'We must lift as we climb."')
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITING THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 46
(1995). According to Delgado:
When I began teaching law in the mid-seventies, I was told by a number of well-
meaning senior colleagues to "play things straight" in my scholarship--to establish
a reputation as scholar in some mainstream legal area and not to get too caught up
in civil rights or other "ethnic subject." Being young, impressionistic, and anxious
to succeed, I took their advice to heart and, for the first six years of my career,
produced a steady stream of articles, book reviews, and the like impeccably
traditional in substance and form. The dangers my friends warned me about were
averted; the benefits accrued. Tenure securely in hand, I turned my attention to
civil rights law and scholarship.
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Notwithstanding that neither Jerome nor Marilyn had much help
negotiating and responding to the institutional racial pressures they
encountered, they managed to succeed and to facilitate the success of other
faculty of color. In other words, despite the fact that they themselves had the
benefit of few helping hands, they were unfailingly selfless in expending their
institutional capital to assist the careers of succeeding generations of minority
scholars. Each of them could likely have had even more power and success
within the legal academy and their own institutions had they not expended so
much of their hard-earned capital on enhancing the opportunities for other
minority scholars. Indeed, had they occasionally supported undermining the
career of some especially rambunctious minority scholar, their influence within
their institutions would have increased immensely.
Yet, what we remember of them is that they were always willing to give
and rarely willing to take. And for both it went without saying that there was a
racial responsibility on the part of people of color to lift as they climb. Ill
health hit them far too early and robbed too many of us of the opportunity to
learn from them.4 The two of us owe them a deep debt, not just for the support
and encouragement that they provided us individually, but for the examples of
selfless behavior that they set. They remain in our hearts and minds. And, we
write this Article hopeful that, at least marginally, it captures the normative
spirit of their lives.
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I. Introduction
Climbing the stairs of the corporate hierarchy is difficult, no matter how
qualified and capable the candidate. Individual corporate officers have to be
appeased, powerful interest groups have to be co-opted and made allies, and
competitors have to be undermined or eliminated. These skills are essential to
corporate success-career advancement-and often simultaneously produce
corporate failures-company demise. Precisely how this success-failure
dynamic manifests itself is, of course, context-dependent as several scholars
have detailed in the recent case of Enron. Still, the phenomenon is
5. For textured analyses of the Enron scandal, see generally William W. Bratton, Enron
and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275 (2002); Lynne L. Dallas, A
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sufficiently generalizable so that, with respect to the numerous corporate
scandals of the past few years, the central question has been: Why do
unscrupulous corporate types often win the race to the top of the corporate
hierarchy? By and large, two narratives have been articulated to answer that
question: the good apple gone bad and the undetected bad seed.
In the good apple gone bad narrative, corporate officers who engage in
scandalous behavior are aberrations, not the norm. There is rarely more than
one or two of them within any corporation. Significant in this story is the
notion that these corporate officers were not always bad-when they were hired
they were good. In this narrative, the corporate governance challenge is to
prevent the one or two bad apples from destroying the corporation and to figure
out what causes good apples to turn bad.
In the undetected bad seed narrative, the corporate officer was never good.
He entered the corporation as a bad seed and grew undetected. Precisely how
he did so is a mystery. Here, the corporate governance challenge is to develop
a screening process that detects and rejects bad seeds and, as a backup, to create
an institutional field within which bad seeds will not grow.
Significantly, in each of the foregoing narratives, the conduct of the
corporate officer figure is nonnormative. In other words, under both
accounts-the good apple gone bad and the undetected bad seed-the CEOs
and CFOs at Tyco, Worldcom, Enron, Adelphia, Healthsouth, and many others
engaged in countercultural corporate behavior. Neither their corporate
misconduct nor their corporate rise should have occurred. In both narratives
the corporation appears as a victim of bad corporate conduct-conduct that
each narrative disaggregates from and represents as oppositional to normative
corporate culture. In part, as a result of these narratives and the twin notions
within them that bad corporate conduct is (a) rare and (b) seldom rewarded with
promotion, the voluminous literature on corporate leadership focuses on the
positive traits of corporate executives, such as self-awareness, motivation,
empathy, the willingness to listen to criticism, the capacity to compromise, and
the ability to inspire.6 Less attention has been paid to what one might call the
"dark side" of leadership.
7
Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors
for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron 's Demise, 35 RuTGERS L.J. 1(2003); Donald
C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 968 (2002); Marleen A.
O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1233 (2001). For a
cautionary note on the lessons that can and cannot be drawn from examining only a handful of
corporate debacles, see generally Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal
Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1517 (2004).
6. These traits and others are discussed at length in a recent issue of the Harvard
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Yet in all of the recent scandals, some organization consciously chose to
promote individuals who were likely to race to the top of the corporation via
lies and obfuscation. And that leads one to ask whether there is something in
the nature of corporate promotion processes that rewards problematic
personality characteristics, 8 for individual corporate officers do not
Business Review that reprinted some of its classic articles on leadership. See, e.g., Diane L.
Coutu, Putting Leaders on the Couch: A Conversation with Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries, HARV.
Bus. REV., Jan. 2004, at 64 (interviewing analytical scholar regarding the profile of successful
leaders); Daniel Goleman, What Makes a Leader?, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan. 2004, at 82
(discussing the components of "emotional intelligence" and applying the concept to businesses);
W.C.H. Prentice, Understanding Leadership, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan. 2004, at 102 (analyzing
leadership and what makes a successful leader); Abraham Zaleznik, Managers and Leaders:
Are They Different?, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan. 2004, at 74 (observing the difference between
business leaders and managers and the environment in which each group succeeds). More
broadly, in this feel-good vein about leadership, see generally WARREN BENNIS & BURT NANUS,
LEADERS: THE STRATEGIES FOR TAKING CHARGE (1985); WARREN BENNIS, ON BECOMING A
LEADER (1989); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, LEADERSHP (1978); JAY A. CONGER & BETH
BENJAMIN, BUILDING LEADERS: How SUCCESSFUL COMPANIES DEVELOPTHENEXTGENERATION
(1999); JOHN P. KoTrER, A FORCE FOR CHANGE: How LEADERSHIP DFERs FROM MANAGEMENT
(1990); THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OFEXCELLENCE: LESSONS
FROM AMERICA'S BEST-RUN COMPANIES (1982).
7. See Barbara Kellerman, Leadership-Warts and All, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan. 2004, at
40 (recognizing prior literature identifying leaders as good people and how these views were
distorted). See generally SYDNEY FINKELSTEIN, WHY SMART ExEcuTVE FAiL: AND WHAT You
CAN LEARN FROM THEIR MISTAKES (2003) (researching the causes of business failure and the
leadership involved); BARBARA KELLERMAN, BAD LEADERSHIP: WHAT IT Is, How IT HAPPENS,
WHY IT MATrERS (2004) (analyzing the harms done by leadership and how to reduce them). For
writing along these lines in the popular press, see Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., How Could They
Have Done It?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2003, at A15 (concluding that those in charge of firms
such as Enron, Tyco, and Worldcom overestimated their ability and underestimated the risk of
being detected).
8. Some corporate law scholars have suggested that the internal promotion dynamics in
these firms were such that they rewarded the kinds of behavior and the types of individuals who
exhibited that behavior that was likely to lead to disasters. See supra note 5 (citing articles).
For example, Langevoort writes the following of the Enron culture:
The [Enron] culture quickly identified itself as special and uniquely competent,
believing that special skill rather than luck (or just being first) was responsible for
the early victories. That self-definition then set a standard for how up-and-coming
people acted out their roles: Enron was a place for winners. With this-and the
stock market's positive feedback-the company's aspiration level rose.
This aspiration level required a high level of risk-taking by the firm, though like
many egocentric people, key decision-makers were probably overconfident in their
ability to manage these risks, and thus underestimated them.... Enron harshly
penalized the laggards at the firm, which, on average, tends to lead to herding
behavior (risk aversion). To counteract this, the company had to magnify the
reward structure considerably for those who ended up as stellar performers-a
winner-take-all kind of tournament.
Presumably this worked, and key people gradually placed more and more risky bets
1652
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systematically lie, cheat, and steal on their own. Sub-organizations within the
corporation support them-that is, protect and promote them. This raises at
least two questions.
First, what are the institutional incentives for the supply of this support?
And second, what types of individuals are most likely to benefit from it?
Though both questions interest us, our primary concern is with the second. It
permits us to engage directly the central theme of this conference, namely, the
relationship between business law and critical race theory (CRT).9 Our aim is
not to articulate a general relationship but rather to combine insights from CRT
and corporate governance theory to tell a tentative story about racial types
and corporate advancement.'0 More particularly, our project is to shed
in a variety of fields, increasingly outside of the firm's core competence. And
predictably, many of these turned bad.... In sum--and in previous work I've
called this the "optimism-commitment whipsaw"-their overconfidence commits
them to a high-risk strategy; once committed to it, they are trapped.
Langevoort, supra note 5, at 973-74. David Skeel makes a somewhat different argument in that
he attributes primary blame not to the internal labor markets of these firms, but to the external
labor market that had become highly volatile--that is, employees no longer stayed with a single
firm for any meaningful length of time but instead jumped from job to job. See generally DAVID
A. SKEEL, JR., ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAws IN CORPORATE AMERICA
AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM (forthcoming 2004) (discussing the development of current
corporate structures and the role of charismatic leaders).
9. For collections of the leading CRT articles, see generally CRmitCALRACE FEMism: A
READER 223-86 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); CRrrcAL RACE THEORY: CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRrcAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002); CRITIcAL
RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000);
CRrTCAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
10. The insight that scholars concerned about equality should focus their lens on the
business law area is not new. For recent articles in this direction, see generally Leonard M.
Baynes, Falling Through the Cracks: Race and Corporate Law Firms, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
785 (2003); Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality
Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025 (2003);
Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of "Corporate Democracy", 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
735 (2003); Steven A. Ramirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VII, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L.
127 (2000); Cheryl L. Wade, Comparisons Between Enron and Other Types of Corporate
Misconduct: Compliance with Law and Ethical Decision Making as the Best Form of Public
Relations, 1 SEATrLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 97 (2002); Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance as
Corporate Social Responsibility: Empathy and Race Discrimination, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1461
(2002). Two recent CRT casebooks move away from the traditional CRT focus on civil rights
and focus instead on economic justice. See generally DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRICAL RACE
THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (2003); EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA
DAVIS, WHEN MARKETS FAIL: A CRMCAL PERSPECTIVE ON ECONOMIC JUSTICE (forthcoming
2005). Ventures such as those mentioned above, however, have been few and far between and,
for the most part, not greeted with great enthusiasm by those who dominate these fields. By
putting together this symposium and encouraging us to think collectively about these issues,
Dorothy Brown is ensuring follow up on these initial attempts.
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light on how people of color negotiate the promotional processes at large
corporations, to identify the types of people of color who are likely to rise to the
top, and to theorize about whether and to what extent these people will perform
door-opening for other nonwhites. Our central claim is that the corporation
both selects for and produces racial types to win multiround promotion
tournaments. These racial types, we contend, are unlikely to be invested in
facilitating the promotion of other nonwhites. We should be clear to point out
that this lack of investment does not derive from a normative commitment on
the part of senior people of color to disidentify with other racial minorities. The
disinvestment exists because of the institutional rewards of racial
disidentification and institutional costs of perceived racial group association.
The corporate governance literature that gives legs to our story is
represented most clearly by the work of Don Langevoort." Of particular
interest to us is Langevoort's engagement of the following question: What
corporate type is most likely to defeat its competitors in the race for promotion?
Note that the question specifically focuses on corporate type. Put another way,
the inquiry is less about widget-making capacity and more about corporate
personality.12  Drawing heavily from the management, psychology, and
institutional economics literature, Langevoort sets forth the identity traits that
corporate leaders are most likely to reward in multiround promotion
tournaments ("probationary crucibles," he calls them1 3): overconfidence, a
11. Two examples of this literature are Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to
Diversity in the Executive Suite: Grease, Grit and the Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1613 (2004) [hereinafter Langevoort, Grease & Grit] and Donald C.
Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals
About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 95 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat] (manuscript
on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. The widget-making capacity and corporate personality distinction is important. The
personality question decenters the importance of widget-making skills and links corporate
advancement to institutional politics or to the capacity to build coalitions and undermine
competitors. See Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat, supra note 11 (manuscript
at 4-9) (discussing how corporate personality has played and will continue to play a role in the
corporate setting). See generally Daniel C. Feldman & Barton A. Weitz, From the Invisible
Hand to the Glad Hand: Understanding a Careerist Orientation to Work, 30 HUM. RESOURCE
MGMT. J. 237 (1991); Langevoort, Grease and Grit, supra note 11. An article on leadership in
The Economist recently made this point in humorous fashion by pointing to research on
chimpanzees. See Creating Leaders: Charisma Helps, but It Is Only a Beginning, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 25, 2003, at 7 (pointing to Frans de Waal's book, CHimPANZEE POLInCS: POWER AND SEX
AMONG APES (rev. ed. 1989), and observing that "battles [for leadership positions] ... are
mainly about the ability to build a coalition of supporters and to outwit rivals, rather than about
size and strength").
13. See Langevoort, Grease and Grit, supra note 11, at 1623 (citing Robert Jackall,
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willingness to take high risks, and a high degree of ethical plasticity.' 4 We
refer to these traits collectively as "advancement traits." Langevoort suggests
MORAL MAZES 68 (1988), from whom he takes the term "probationary crucibles").
14. Id. Langevoort's insights on risk-taking and overoptimism rest on a large body of
research in a variety of areas, including the following: J. EDWARD Russo & PAUL J.H.
SCHOEMAKER, DECISION TRAPS: TEN BARRmRS TO BRILLIANT DECISION-MAKING AND How TO
OVERCOME THEM (Fireside 1990) (1989); MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, LEARNED OPTIMISM (1991);
Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective
on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. ScI. 17 (1993); SIMON GERVAIS ET AL., OVERCONFIDENCE,
INVESTMENT POLICY, AND EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS (Rodney L. White Center for Fin.
Research, Working Paper No. 15-02), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract=
361200 (2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). On the theoretical side, see
generally Roland Btnabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation, 117 Q. J.
ECON. 871 (2002); Anand Mohan Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, Rationality, Overconfidence, and
Leadership (unpublished draft), at http://papers. ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=244999
(Sept. 2000) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
On ethical plasticity, Langevoort's insights diverge from the assumption that it is those
who cooperate best and are the most loyal who will be most likely to be rewarded in a
promotion system that values production in teams. See generally Robert Cooter & Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717 (2001)
(making the point that traditional economics puts too much emphasis on opportunism and that
firms are likely to select those who are most likely to demonstrate more altruistic tendencies);
Ram T.S. Ramakrishnan & Anjan V. Thakor, Cooperation Versus Competition in Agency, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 248 (1991) (researching the choice and effects of cooperation versus competition
among agents in conglomerate mergers and within organizational incentive-based systems).
That makes sense, Langevoort says, except that the evaluation of who is the best cooperator and
who is most loyal takes the form of a competition. The person who will be promoted, therefore,
will be the one who is best able to outperform his colleagues in demonstrating loyalty and
cooperation, and that person is not always the person who is, in fact, most loyal and cooperative.
Instead, in many settings it will be someone who can appear to be loyal while actually being
opportunistic; someone with a chameleon-like personality. Langevoort, Grease and Grit, supra
note 11, at 1620-25; see also Martin Kilduff & David Day, Do Chameleons Get Ahead? The
Effects of Self-Monitoring on Managerial Careers, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1047, 1048 (1994)
(observing that evidence indicates that an individual's success in an organization can be
increased by controlling impressions). What Langevoort is describing is a kind of hyper-
rationality in that he rejects the simple prediction that just because organizations desire
employees who are loyal, fair, and team oriented, they will end up hiring those people. Instead,
because employees will modify their behavior to appear to be what the organization desires, the
organization is likely to hire those who can best appear to have those characteristics. See
Samuel Bowles et al., The Determinants of Earnings: A Behavioral Approach, 39 J. ECON.
LrrERATURE 1137, 1161-62 (2001) (examining the role of incentive-enhancing personal
characteristics on earnings); Myron Gable & Frank Dangello, Locus of Control,
Machiavellianism and Managerial Job Performance, 128 J. PSYCHOL. 599,600 (1994) (noting
that managers with manipulative Machiavellian tendencies are more likely to advance).
The idea of a "chameleon-like" personality has a close link to the notions of "high self
monitoring" and "code switching" that are more commonly discussed in the academic literature
on organizational behavior and social psychology. People who can shape their identity to the
needs of an organizational context are found to be more likely to succeed to leadership positions
and to fill key structural holes in the organization. See generally Robert J. Ellis et al., Self-
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that to the extent that the people at the top of the corporation-mostly white
men-got there by exhibiting advancement traits, they are less likely to comply
with a variety of regulatory mandates, including those relating to racial
diversity. 15
But what if those at the top of the corporate hierarchy are people of color?
What types of racial minorities are they likely to be? Only a decade or two
Monitoring and Leadership Emergence in Groups, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
681 (1988); Ajay Mehra et al., The Social Networks of High and Low Self-Monitors:
Implications for Workplace Performance, 46 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 121 (2001); Stephen J. Zaccaro et
al., Leadership and Social Intelligence: Linking Social Perspectiveness and Behavioral
Flexibility to Leader Effectiveness, 2 LEADERSHIPQ. 317 (1991); Stephen J. Zaccaro et al., Self-
Monitoring and Trait-Based Variance in Leadership: An Investigation of Leader Flexibility
Across Multiple Group Situations, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 308 (1991). On the relationship
between the terms of "self monitoring" and "code switching," see William E. Cross & Linda
Strauss, The Everyday Functions of African American Identity, in PREJUDICE: THE TARGET'S
PERSPECTIVE 267, 273-76 (Janet K. Swim & Charles Stangor eds., 1998).
15. Writing in a similar vein as Langevoort, David Skeel, another participant in this
Symposium, emphasizes the tendency of high-velocity labor markets to overvalue leadership
characteristics such as charisma. See SKEEL, supra note 8, at 7 ("Corporate culture continues to
reward managers who are willing to take risks and don't second guess the genius of the
decisions they make."). Like Langevoort, Skeel draws heavily from the management literature.
On the tendency of certain types of business settings to excessively reward certain traits-
charisma-and psychological types-narcissists, see generally RAKESH KHuRANA, SEARCHING
FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR, THE IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs (2002); Michael
Macoby, Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, the Inevitable Cons, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 68. For more on the problems that are likely to result from the selection of
these individuals for advancement, see generally Lisa M. Penney & Paul E. Spector, Narcissism
and the Counterproductive Work Behavior: Do Bigger Egos Mean Bigger Problems?, 10 INT'L
J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 126 (2002). Others suggest that organizations going through
internal turbulence can sometimes have environments that are conducive to the success of
psychopaths. See Paul Babiak, When Psychopaths Go to Work: A Case Study of an Industrial
Psychopath, 44 APPLIED PSYCHOL. 171, 176 (1995) (suggesting that "in the chaotic business
world of 'flattening', 'right-sizing', mergers, and acquisitions, a large number of transitional
organisations [sic] exist, offering variety and stimulus without the controls found in more stable
organisations [sic], and may offer an environment conducive to psychopathic manipulation").
For other discussions in this vein, see generally Paul Babiak, Psychopathic Manipulation at
Work, in THE CLINICAL AND FORENSIC ASSESSMENT OF PSYCHOPATHY: A PRACTTONER'S GUIDE
287 (Carl B. Gacono ed., 2000); Sigrid B. Gustafson & Darren R. Ritzer, The Dark Side of
Normal: A Psychopathy-Linked Pattern Called Aberrant Self-Promotion, 9 EUR. J.
PERSONALITY 147 (1995). These discussions have even made their way into the popular press.
See Hilary Freeman, Psycho Bosses on the Loose: Are You in Their Line of Fire?, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, Mar. 10, 2001, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4149556,
00.htnl (last visited Oct. 22, 2004) (describing research in the area by scholars such as Paul
Babiak and Robert Hare) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Simon English,
Psycho at the Top?, THE AGE, Oct. 29, 2002, at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/
10/281035683360087.html? oneclick=true/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2004) (same) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review). For the purpose of this Article, we focus on the multiround
tournament structure that Langevoort describes.
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ago, this would have been a pointless inquiry; there were almost no minorities
who successfully traveled to the top of the corporate hierarchy. But today,
while the numbers are decidedly small, people of color are reaching the top,
and others are on their way. For the most part, CRT has addressed the issue of
minority presence in the corporate context with arguments about
underrepresentation and employment discrimination. 16 While these arguments
are important, there is another intellectual use for CRT. 17 The literature can
help us conceive of the corporation itself as a racial body-a body that
produces and makes promotional decisions based on racial types.18 By racial
16. See generally Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365; Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Policies, 1989 U. Cin. LEGAL F. 139; Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America:
Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE
L.J. 1329 (1991).
17. Part of the intellectual project of CRT is to think critically about ostensibly neutral
institutions such as law. See generally Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101HARV.L.REV.
1331 (1988). In conducting this inquiry, thus far CRT scholars primarily have focused on those
areas of law where racial issues are directly implicated, like the following: equal protection law,
(Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1753 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's interpretation and application of equal treatment
as equal protection and the effect on inequality)), election law, (Spencer Overton, But Some Are
More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance, 80 TEX. L. REv. 987 (2002) (utilizing
race to analyze campaign finance laws)), criminal law, (Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury
Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 911 (1997) (asserting that selective jury
nullification is a way to alter the unjust effect that the American criminal justice system has on
African Americans)), immigration law, (Leti Volpp, Court-Stripping and Class-Wide Relief: A
Response to Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 463
(2000) (discussing Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(f) in detail)), and Fourth Amendment
law, (Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REv. 946 (2002)
(exposing non-neutral investments of Fourth Amendment law)); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops,
and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 425 (1997) (same)).
Racial disadvantage and bias may be embedded in other areas of law as well, which, of
course, is Dorothy Brown's rationale for organizing this Symposium--to turn the CRT lens on
the business arena. Arguably, the area of law that most directly implicates economic power is
business law. To the extent that one is interested in revealing hidden biases that translate into
economic disadvantage, a critical inquiry into this area is vital. For example, consider a new
bankruptcy reform policy that is meant to further economic responsibility by restricting the
ability of individuals to file personal bankruptcy. A CRT inquiry may reveal that this new
legislation is driven by the interest of certain large credit card companies who lend primarily to
low income families at exorbitant interest rates with the hope that these families will not be able
to escape the debt trap. On the flip side, it may be that some new legislation to make corporate
bankruptcy easier transfers wealth away from minority groups because it disproportionately
benefits the managerial class, which is likely to be predominantly white and male.
18. This inquiry could broaden the context in which CRT scholars make claims about the
social construction of race. See generally Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of
1657
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645 (2004)
type we do not mean the standard racial categories-black, white, Asian, Latina
or Latino, and Native American. We mean, roughly, self-representations of
nonwhite identity that can be interpreted either as racially palatable or racially
salient. A person is racially palatable if she is perceived to be peripherally or
unstereotypically nonwhite; she is racially salient if she is perceived to be
centrally or stereotypically nonwhite.
At least two reasons exist for paying attention to the corporation as a racial
body that selects for and produces racial types. The first relates to what we
have previously called the "diversity constraint."'19 Large corporations are
under some public pressure to racially diversify their management ranks. Thus,
there is a disincentive for them to make promotional decisions that result in
zero people of color at the top. Corporate racism, in this sense, is often
designed to achieve partial, and not total, exclusion. In other words, the
corporation will hire and promote some nonwhites-those it perceives to be,
and those it perceives have the capacity to become, racially palatable. Because
racially palatable nonwhites do not enter the corporation fully formed (they are
developed by corporate culture), an examination of the corporation as a racial
body can help to identify the parameters of this developmental process and to
articulate the content of the character of the racial types this process produces.°
Another reason exists for conceiving of the corporation as an identity-
producing racial body. Those of us who are cautiously optimistic about the
advancement of racial minorities in high-level workplaces rest some of our
hope on the door-opening effects of first generation successes. 2' The thinking
Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1994).
19. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory,
112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1793 (2003) (book review).
20. Cf SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN
AMERICA (1990). The "critical" perspective in all of this is in realizing that those in power at
these corporate organizations-that is, those same organizations that are publicly espousing
their commitment to diversity-are often white men. The shape that diversity takes, therefore,
will be a function of what those white men want. On the observation that any understanding of
diversity initiatives needs to consider extant power dynamics, see Erica Gabrielle Foldy,
'Managing' Diversity: Identity and Power in Organizations, in GENDER, IDENTITY AND THE
CULTURE OF ORGANIZATIONS 92, 94 (iris Aaltio & Albert J. Mills eds., 2002).
21. The classic reference on this hope is to W.E.B. DuBois's concept of the "talented
tenth," the elite in the black community, whom he hoped would do the work of pulling up the
less fortunate others. W.E.B. DuBois, The Talented Tenth, in THE NEGRO PROBLEM: A SERIES
OF ARTICLES BY REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN NEGROES OF TODAY (Booker T. Washington ed.,
1903). At the time, DuBois's ideas about the importance of the success of the black elites to the
successes of the community as a whole stood in contrast to those of Booker T. Washington, who
instead emphasized the need to focus on the advancement of those in the working class. JoY
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is that the successes of the first generation of racial minorities will, among other
things, reduce negative stereotyping, create better mentorship opportunities,
and enhance internal accountability on racial issues. However, the racial types
that corporations help produce 22 to win multiround promotion tournaments
might not be invested in the success of other nonwhites; put another way, they
might not negate stereotypes, provide mentorship, or increase racial
accountability. The more we depend on the efforts of the first generation to
engage in door-opening activities--or, at least, not to perform door-closing
activities-to ensure greater success for later generations, the more important it
is for us to examine what types of racial minorities are likely to succeed in
corporate environments and the role of the corporation in producing those racial
types.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets forth eight
ways in which the initial successes of people of color in a corporate context can
ameliorate discrimination. We call this dynamic the "racial trickle down
effect"; the benefits of having a racial minority at the top will trickle down to
those at the bottom. 23 Part Ill constructs a stylized model of the promotion
process as it applies to minorities. Our aim here is to identify the types of
minorities who are most likely to race to the top of the corporation. Part IV
then raises the question of whether and to what extent these racial types will
perform the discrimination-ameliorative functions outlined in Part II. Part V
concludes with a discussion of the implications of our argument for
antidiscrimination law.
II. The Benefits We Assume Will Accrue from the First Generation of
Minority Successes in the Workplace
This Part sets forth a set of benefits that theoretically flow from first
generation nonwhite corporate successes: stereotype negation, racial
monitoring, racial accountability, racial cooperation, a reduction in racial
comfort work and the burdens of tokenism, positive role modeling, and
JAMES, TRANSCENDING THE TALENTED TENTH: BLACK LEADERS AND AMERiCAN INTELLECTUALS
22 (1997). In later years, with his support from the black middle class having largely dissipated
and most of his support coming from the working class, DuBois himself famously lost much of
his hope regarding the elites. W.E.B. DuBois, IN BATTLE FOR PEACE 173-74 (1952).
22. Our claim is not that corporations do all of the racial production work. Instead, the
claim is that corporations play a role in producing racial types.
23. Cf. Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1283 (2002) (exploring
the difficulties of identifying and managing racial groups at the bottom).
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mentoring-collectively, the trickle down benefits. Though each of these
benefits are interrelated, for heuristic purposes, we discuss them separately.
A. Stereotype Negation
Because most extant discrimination is a function of malleable stereotypes
and not explicit animus,24 formulating and implementing mechanisms to negate
those stereotypes is a crucial antiracist project.25 Arguably, senior minority
corporate successes operate as a stereotype negating mechanism to the extent
that they experience less stereotype threat and greater autonomy. The theory is
this: The simple fact of minority success in the corporate promotion
tournament will undermine, if not completely disrupt, negative racial
stereotypes about work ethic and competence.26 If Johnny, who is black
24. This has been one of the most consistent criticisms of the Supreme Court's
conceptualization of racism as a problem of conscious intentionality. See Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (holding that to establish an equal protection claim, the plaintiff
must prove intentional racial decisionmaking on the part of the state); Alan Freeman, Racism,
Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 295,308 (1988) (stating that the Court's decision in Washington v. Davis was based on
the "fantasy" that "racism was an individualistic problem located through careful inquiries into
issues such as 'causation' or 'intent"'); Charles R. Lawrence III, "Justice"or "Just Us": Racism
and the Role ofIdeology, 35 STAN. L. REV. 831, 848-50 (1983) (book review) (arguing that the
intent requirement in Washington v. Davis prohibits antidiscrimination law from dealing with
decisionmaking that maintains existing discriminatory conditions). See generally Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (arguing
that biased employment practices often result from categorization-based judgment errors and not
from intentional discrimination); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) [hereinafter
Lawrence, The Id] (arguing that discriminatory decisionmaking is usually caused by
unconscious beliefs, attitudes, and ideas about race).
25. But see generally IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF
RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001) (suggesting that intentional racial discrimination
remains a very real social problem and is far more pervasive than we think).
26. The value of this stereotype negation effect is often given as a reason for why
affirmative action should be abolished, the theory being that the presence of affirmative action
muddies the unambiguous signal of merit that minority success would otherwise provide to all
concerned. See, e.g., Stylianos-Ioannis G. Koutnatzis, Affirmative Action in Education: The
Trust and Honesty Perspective, 7 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 187, 251-54 (2002) (discussing
stereotype-based objections to affirmative action); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark:
Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 906 n.490 (2004) ("[T]he
durable and demeaning stereotype of black people as unable to compete with white ones is
reinforced by advocates of certain forms of affirmative action." (quoting STEPHEN L. CARTER,
REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 49-50 (1991))); Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-
Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1173 (2002) ("Racial preferences, however
well-intentioned, have poisonous consequences for the very minority groups they are intended
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and male, makes his way to the top of the corporate hierarchy, the theory goes,
his success performs both an individual and a group signification-namely,
Johnny has the capacity and the commitment to lead a corporation and so do
other black men. 27 The combined effect of both significations is to open up
institutional space for the corporation to promote junior black men.
There is another more subtle stereotype negation dynamic at work as well.
According to the emerging literature on stereotype threat, people of color
under-perform when they perceive the risk that their performance will confirm
negative racial stereotypes. 28 The presence of successful people could reduce
this threat in at least two ways. First, junior people of color could conclude
from the presence of successful people of color that the corporation is racially
tolerant and, more particularly, that the corporate culture is not corrupted by
negative racial stereotypes. There is no "threat in the air. ',29 Second, the
success of senior people of color could suggest to the juniors that corporate
leaders do not interpret the mistakes of nonwhites to be racially
predetermined-that is to say, as a confirmation of existing racial
to benefit."). Supporters of affirmative action counter that affirmative action ensures the
representation of minorities in predominantly white corporate environments, and this presence
sends a message that minorities belong. See Gabriel J. Chin et al., Beyond Self-Interest: Asian
Pacific Americans Toward a Community of Justice, a Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4
AsIAN PAC. Am. L.J. 129, 134 (1996) ("Affirmative action also moderates outdated stereotypes
by helping racial minorities achieve non-stereotypical positions of leadership and status.");
Cynthia L. Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society: Preliminary Thoughts on the
Role of Labor and Employment Law, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 49, 65 n.61 (1998) ("But the
contact theory research provides at least some significant data to suggest that, on balance,
workplace integration, which is certainly partly a result of affirmative action efforts, tends to
foster interracial understanding and reduce hostility and negative stereotypes."); Lenhardt,
supra, at 915 ("But [the contrary view] of the future is greatly contradicted by the history of
affirmative action to date. Studies demonstrate that, with affirmative action, racial minorities
are better represented in areas such as medicine, law, and business than they ever have been.").
For our purposes, it is enough to note that both sides of the debate recognize the importance of
stereotype negation in eliminating contemporary discrimination.
27. Because racial stereotypes often have gender specificity, Johnny's success would not
necessarily send a strong signal about the capacity for black women to succeed in that corporate
environment. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 16 (articulating the concept of
intersectionality to suggest, among other things, that race and gender intersect to affect black
women's and black men's vulnerability to discrimination differently).
28. For classic works on the subject, see generally Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson,
Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995), and Joshua Aronson et al., Stereotype Threat and
the Academic Underperformance of Minorities and Women, in PREJUDICE: THE TARGET'S
PERSPECTIVE 83 (Janet K. Swim & Charles Stangor eds., 1998).
29. The reference is to Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape
Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 613 (1997).
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stereotypes. 30 To the extent that junior people of color respond to the success
of seniors in either or both of the foregoing ways, they will likely experience
less of a stereotype threat and greater workplace autonomy. Moreover, they are
likely to perform their jobs more effectively.
31
B. Racial Monitoring
The presence of minorities at the upper echelons of the corporate
hierarchy, even in limited numbers, produces racial monitoring.32 To
appreciate how, imagine a law firm that has been asked to represent a
conservative organization in its effort to strike down affirmative action. The
mere presence of some black partners on that firm's executive committee,
which decides which cases to take, produces at least two monitoring effects-a
discourse effect and an outcome effect. At the most basic level, white members
of the executive committee will engage the issue of whether to take the case
with the awareness that what they say may offend their black colleagues.
In other words, the tone and substance of the conversation-the
30. On the point that when race is made more salient in a positive or justice-oriented
context, people are less likely to engage in bias, see Gary Blasi, Default Discrimination: Law,
Science, and Unintended Discrimination in the New Workplace, in BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION: VOLUME IN HONOR OF DAVID B. CHARNY (Michael J. Yelnosky
& Mitu Gulati eds., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 27, on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review) (citing to research in the jury context); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald,
On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of
Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803-04 (2001)
(finding that individuals exposed to pictures of Michael Jordan and Tiger Woods, prior to
testing for bias, demonstrated reduced amounts of racial bias). There is also the related point
that the presence of these role models might reduce the stereotype threat that scholars like
Claude Steele have identified. See supra note 28 (citing material on stereotype threat).
31. See Rusty B. McIntyre et al., Alleviating Women's Mathematics Stereotype Threat
Through Salience of Positive Group Achievements, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 83,86
(2003) (finding that college women performed better on tests where they first read about four
women who had been successes in their fields); see also Arlene G. Asuncion & Diane M.
Mackie, Undermining Social Stereotypes: Impact of Affect-Relevant and Behavior-Relevant
Information, 18 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 367,382-83 (1996) (finding that participants'
willingness to apply stereotypes was undermined the most where inconsistent information
presented was most directly relevant to the stereotypes). For further examination of these
effects, see generally Rusty B. McIntyre et al., Social Impact of Successful Group Members on
Improving Women's Performance Under Mathematics Stereotype Threat (2003) (unpublished
draft) (on file with authors).
32. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, What Exactly Is Racial Diversity?, 49 CAL. L.
REV. 1149, 1159-62 (2003) (book review) (explaining that the mere presence of racial
minorities can affect speech).
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discourse-will be shaped by the perception (which may or may not be real)
that the black partners present are racially monitoring the conversation.
In addition to the foregoing discourse effect, black presence could also
determine whether the partners accept the case. The white partners could
believe that taking the case would so anger or alienate their black colleagues
that it is against their long-term institutional interests to do so. One can
imagine these monitoring effects occurring at other institutional moments as
well; for example, during firm meetings about hiring and promotions. The
presence of some minorities on the hiring and promotion committees might
temper those who might otherwise be tempted to make arguments based on
racial stereotypes-the discourse effect-and shape the bottom-line decisions
the partners make about who to hire and promote-the outcome effect.
33
Both discourse and outcome racial monitoring effects can be intensified
via affirmative conduct or intervention by the person of color.34 If, in the above
example, a black member of the firm's executive committee speaks to the racial
implications of the firm taking an anti-affirmative action case, white partners
will be even more careful about how they discuss the issue, and they will
perhaps be less likely to take the case.35 Active engagement, then, produces
stronger monitoring effects than mere presence.
36
33. See supra note 30 (presenting studies that show that when race becomes a salient
issue, bias decreases).
34. The obligation to act affirmatively is discussed in a series of articles by David Wilkins
about the "obligation thesis." David B. Wilkins, Essay: Identities and Roles: Race,
Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1556 (1998). For examples
of Wilkins's research focusing on the related questions of (a) the obligations of those in the
minority community who succeed in the corporate world to help their community and
(b) whether the economic pressures that apply within institutions like corporate law firms allow
for "doing well by doing good," see generally id.; David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the
Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers,
45 STAN. L. REv. 1981 (1993).
35. Research suggests that the effect of making salient the danger that decisionmakers
might be acting in a prejudiced manner can reduce the amount of prejudice (assuming that
acting with prejudice is a disfavored behavior). See generally Steven J. Spencer et al., The Role
of Motivation in the Unconscious: How Our Motives Control the Activation of Our Thoughts
and Shape Our Actions, in SOCIAL MOTIVATION: CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES
(Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds., forthcoming 2004).
36. Active engagement will produce the strongest monitoring effect when it takes the form
of institutional criticism. If, for example, a minority employee consistently engages the
institution in conversations about the relationship between minority underrepresentation and the
firm's selection and promotion processes, the partners may perceive that every hiring and
promotion decision is being monitored. This perception could shape the outcome of the firm's
hiring and promotion practices.
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C. Racial Accountability
Related to racial monitoring is racial accountability-the idea that white
decisionmakers will have to account for any institutional decision that
negatively affects nonwhites. Consider a firm that is contemplating extending
offers to ten white attorneys. The accountability costs of the firm doing so is
directly related to the number of people of color, particularly partners, at the
firm. Put differently, the more people of color at the firm in leadership
positions, the more difficult it will be for the firm to "account" for an entering
class with no, or very few, people of color.
D. Racial Cooperation
Much corporate labor is performed in the context of teams. And the
success of any given team is a function of whether and to what extent team
members trust each other. The greater the level of trust among team members,
the more efficient the team, and the more efficient the team, the more
successful individual team members are likely to be. Race can be a barrier to
the establishment of team trust. Nonwhites may be suspicious of the extent to
which their white colleagues are invested in cooperating with them; whites may
wonder whether nonwhites can be trusted to subordinate their racial identity
commitments for the good of the team.
People of color in leadership positions can reduce racial distrust and
facilitate racial cooperation. For one thing, senior minorities can provide input
into the formation of teams to maximize opportunities for racial cooperation
and minimize the likelihood of racial tensions and anxieties. For another, the
very presence of senior people of color might suggest to whites that nonwhites
can work effectively in teams and can be trusted, and nonwhites might
conclude from senior minority presence that racial cooperation is possible. In
short, the greater the presence of senior people of color, the greater the
probability that nonwhites and whites will be more trusting of each other. They
might even conclude that the differences among them are superficial,37
37. The statement in the text is an oversimplification. As research into the "contact"
question has demonstrated, a number of conditions, such as equality of status, need to be
satisfied before contact between the groups effectively can reduce prejudice. The research to
this question derives from and builds on the classic work THE NATURE OF PREJUDiCE by Gordon
W. Allport, who set forth a set of conditions under which intergroup contact would reduce
prejudice and enhance tolerance that have since been examined, modified, and re-examined.
For a discussion of this hypothesis and the literature following Allport, see generally
Marilynn B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup Relations, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
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and therefore that race ought not be a basis for judging a person's willingness
and capacity to work in teams.
E. Racial Comfort
Part of the difficulty people of color experience working in predominantly
white workplaces relates to racial comfort. Because nonwhite identity
signifies racial difference and because this difference is perceived to cause grit
not grease, 39 people of color have the burden of making whites feel comfortable
with their nonwhite identity.4° The fewer people of color within the
organization and the fewer minority success stories, the heavier the racial
comfort burden. Conversely, the more people of color within a firm and the
more minority success stories, the less intense white anxieties will be about
racial difference and the capacity of nonwhites to fit comfortably within the
predominantly white workplace. In this way, first generation minority
successes help to diminish the amount of racial comfort work second generation
employees have to perform.4' Put another way, first generation successes
reduce the demand for, and the supply of, racial comfort work.42
PSYCHOLOGY 554 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998); Miles Hewstone, Contact and
Categorization: Social Psychological Interventions to Change Intergroup Relations, in
STEREOTYPES AND STEREOTYPING 323 (C. Neil Macrae et al. eds., 1996); Michele Andrisin
Wittig & Sheila Grant-Thompson, The Utility ofAllport's Conditions of intergroup Contact for
Predicting Perceptions of Improved Racial Attitudes and Beliefs, 54 J. Soc. ISSUES 795 (1998).
For a discussion of this literature in the legal arena, see generally Cynthia L. Estlund, The
Changing Workplace as a Locus of integration in a Diverse Society, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
331.
38. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1259 (2000) (discussing the concept of racial comfort).
39. See generally Langevoort, Grease and Grit, supra note 11.
40. See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 19 (arguing that there is an incentive for
institutions to maintain homogenous workplace cultures for the interrelated reasons of comfort
and efficiency).
41. Racial comfort work is part of broader identity management strategy people of color
employ to navigate predominantly white workplaces. For recent research on the topic of
minority self-presentation and identity construction in majoritarian work settings, see generally
Laura Morgan Roberts, Changing Faces: Professional Image Construction in Diverse
Organizational Settings, ACAD. MGmT. REv. (publication forthcoming) (manuscript on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sandra E. Cha & Laura Morgan Roberts, Professional
Image Construction Among Asian American Journalists: Strategies for Leveraging and
Countering Stereotypes (Aug. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). For a fascinating treatment of the extra costs that minorities bear in terms of
the consumer purchases (for example, purchasing high status goods like Remi Martin cognac,
Brooks Brothers or Armani suits, and BMW cars) they make in order to counteract negative
stereotypes, see generally Michle Lamont & Virdg Molndr, How Blacks Use Consumption to
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F. Role Modeling
A standard argument for racial diversity is that it produces positive role
modeling effects.43 Significantly, this argument is less about what people of
color do at the top of the corporation and more about the fact that they are
there.44 While the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the benefits
Shape Their Collective Identity: Evidence from Marketing Specialists, 1J. CONSUMER CULTURE
31 (2001).
42. For descriptions of the dynamics of this presentational dilemma and the risks that
minorities face in negotiating their everyday identities in the workplace, see generally Carbado
& Gulati, supra note 38; Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L.
REv. 103 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Conversations at Work]; Devon W. Carbado &
Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701 (2001); Carbado &
Gulati, supra note 19.
43. See, e.g., Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 CAL. L.
REv. 1109, 1116 (2003) (articulating the standard role modeling argument for racial diversity).
Diversity can establish the credibility of an institution, build bridges to other
communities, and increase sensitivity to and awareness of diverse clientele and
constituents. This is true whether the context is a union seeking to organize in a
minority or immigrant community, a business looking to expand its markets to new
communities, or a social service agency seeking to serve minority or culturally
isolated populations.
[D]iversity provides role models for those historically excluded. It can provide a
source of hope and inspiration for those who would otherwise limit their horizons
and aspirations.
Id.; F. Michael Higginbotham, Affirmative Action in the United States and South Africa:
Lessons from the Other Side, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 187, 207 (1999) ("The existence of
minorities in positions of prestige and power provides role models to young impressionable
children. Having minorities employed in fields which have largely been dominated by white's
[sic], opens children's eyes to many career possibilities."); Jonathan Alger, When Color-Blind Is
Color-Bland: Ensuring Faculty Diversity in Higher Education, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 191,
194 (1999) ("[O]ne argument [seeking to justify faculty diversity], often called the role model
theory, holds that faculty of color in a variety of disciplines are seen as role models for
underrepresented students of color.").
44. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and
Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 405, 481 (2000). (claiming that Justice Clarence
Thomas was confirmed as a Supreme Court Justice because of his status as a role model). Ifill
states:
[Clarence] Thomas was the first Supreme Court nominee who came to the
nomination proceedings almost exclusively as a role model. Distinguishing himself
in neither.., big law firm practice nor academia. .. , Thomas's supporters
advanced his race and his perseverance in overcoming childhood poverty and
racism to the public as his principal qualifications for service on the Court....
Thomas and his backers used Thomas's race and his experience with poverty to
create an image of Thomas as the ultimate role model.
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of role modeling can function as a compelling state interest for affirmative
action,45 the argument continues to have traction in academic and social
contexts.46 Central to the role modeling argument is the notion that at least
Id. Ifill goes on to say:
While Thomas's backers viewed him as a black role model, to many blacks,
Thomas was not a role model. In fact, given his record. . . , his political views ....
and his disparaging remarks about well-regarded black leaders, most blacks would
have considered Thomas the very opposite of a role model....
Despite [many black leaders' and civil rights organizations'] disagreement with
nearly all of Thomas's positions on civil rights issues, a majority of blacks
supported Thomas .... Some advocated supporting Thomas because they feared
that if Thomas were not confirmed, President Bush would appoint a white
candidate to fill the position.
Id. at 482-83; Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
1377, 1384 n.20 (1996) (referring to Cornel West's analysis of Justice Thomas's confirmation).
Addis states:
Discussing what he saw as the racial reasoning of the black leadership that
prevailed during the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill Senate hearing, [Cornel West]
comments: "Unfortunately, most black leaders remained caught in a framework of
racial reasoning--even when they opposed Thomas and/or supported Hill. Rarely
did we have a black leader highlight the moral content of a mature black identity,
accent the crucial role of coalition strategy in the struggle for justice, or promote
the ideal of black cultural democracy. Instead, the debate evolved around glib
formulations of a black 'role model' based on mere pigmentation ......
Id. (quoting CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 31 (1993)); Maya Angelou, I Dare to Hope, in
COURT OF APPEAL: THE BLACK COMMUNITY SPEAKS OUT ON THE RACIAL AND SExuAL PoLmcs
OF CLARENCE THOMAS vs. ANITA HILL 33, 35 (Robert Chrisman & Robert L. Allen eds., 1992)
("Because Clarence Thomas has been poor, has been nearly suffocated by the acrid odor of
racial discrimination, is intelligent, well trained, black and young enough to be won over again,
I support him.").
For a more general discussion of the race and gender politics implicated in Clarence
Thomas's judicial appointment, see Devon W. Carbado, The Construction of O.J. Simpson as a
Racial Victim, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 49,77-81 (1997).
45. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,275-76 (1986) (refusing to utilize
the role model theory); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305-10 (1978)
(refusing to consider remedying the amorphous effects of past "societal discrimination" a
compelling state interest).
46. See, e.g., John Valery White, What Is Affirmative Action?, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2117,
2168 n.241 (2004) (commenting that the contours of the academic debate over affirmative
action are well known). White states:
Supporters [of affirmative action] retort that the relationship between African
Americans and whites is hardly symmetrical, and that racial preferences are
necessary to remedy discrimination, to provide role models for the disadvantaged,
and to increase diversity.... Although little new can be said about these
arguments, the dispute continues with no sign of resolution.
Id.; Eric A. Tilles, Lessons from Bakke: The Effect of Grutter on Affirmative Action in
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one barrier to people of color moving up the corporate hierarchy is the
difficulty they have imagining themselves there.47 The greater the extent of
racial underrepresentation at the upper echelons of the corporation, the more
difficult this racial imagining. Conversely, the more diverse the corporate
boardroom and the more successful the people of color there, the greater the
likelihood that junior people of color will imagine themselves occupying
similar positions of power and authority. In sum, the basic role modeling
insight is that the presence of people of color at the top of the corporation sends
a positive message to people of color at the bottom that they, too, can ascend
the corporate hierarchy.
G. Tokenism
Subsequent to the passage of antidiscrimination laws, workplace scholars
48identified tokenism as a significant barrier to minority success. Tokenism
Employment, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 451,460 (2004) (explaining some scholars' arguments
that the Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), opinion seems to approve of the role model
theory that Wygant rejected and countering that "the closest Grutter comes to arguing in favor
of the role model theory is ... [that it advances] the legitimacy of societal leadership, not
models for minority students to follow").
47. See Richard Delgado, Essay: Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do
You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1222, 1223 n.5 (1991) (explaining the
role model argument.).
The role model argument, in simplest form, holds that affirmative action is justified
in order to provide communities of color with exemplars of success, without which
they might conclude that certain social roles and professional opportunities are
closed to them. Role models are expected to communicate to their communities
that opportunities are indeed available and that hard work and perseverance will be
rewarded.
Id. (citations omitted).
48. The classic work on tokenism and the burdens that come associated with it is
ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WoMEN OFTHE CORPORATION (2d ed. 1993). Kanter's focus
was on women and the dynamics with respect to other groups such as racial minorities are likely
to be different. For more recent discussions, see Louise Marie Roth, The Social Psychology of
Tokenism: Status and Homophily Processes on Wall Street, 47 Soc. PERSP. 189,208-10(2004)
(finding that tokenism effects are diminished in the presence of objective evaluations, mentors,
and specialized skills); Michael J. Yelnosky, The Prevention Justification for Affirmative
Action, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385, 1389-99 (2003) (reviewing and discussing the recent literature
on tokenism). Cf Christine L. Williams, The Glass Escalator: Hidden Advantages for Men in
the "Female" Professions, 39 Soc. PROBS. 253,263 (1992) (finding that the disadvantages that
men face in female-dominated professions are significantly different from those that women face
in male-dominated fields). See generally Elizabeth Chambliss & Christopher Uggen, Men and
Women of Elite Law Firms: Reevaluating Kanter's Legacy, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 41 (2000).
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refers to instances in which a firm (a) hires a small number of persons of color
and (b) does little to integrate them into the firm culture. A firm's reason for
practicing tokenism will not always be invidious. But whatever intentionality
underwrites the practice, one of its institutional effects is simultaneously to
legitimize the existence of a predominantly white workplace and provide the
firm with a defense against discrimination. The rhetorical form this
legitimation defense takes looks something like this: "It is true that most of our
associates are white. However, it is not true that we discriminate against
Asians. We hired Mathew, a Korean American, last year, and we are hopeful
that we will hire more people like Mathew in the future."
Tokenism burdens people of color in three significant ways. First,
tokenism burdens the token with the weight of representing his entire race. The
cost of his failure is imposed not simply on him but on his race as a whole.
Consequently, the token's every action is racially representative.49 He becomes
his race and, more particularly, an indication of the potential-or lack thereof-
of his race. Second, tokenism limits the token's sense of autonomy. His
interactions will likely be overdetermined by his awareness of the
representative function his identity performs. For example, Mathew, the
Korean-American executive, might avoid interacting with technical support
staff out of fears that it might racially represent his group as technically but not
creatively inclined. A third problem with tokenism is that it requires the token
to negotiate his belonging. The very reason he is a token likely derives from
the perception (which may or may not be conscious) that members of his race
do not belong. The token has to be careful not to internalize this idea, and he
has to be vigilant about counteracting it.
The success of the first generation (most of whom were tokens) and their
presence at the top of corporate hierarchies reduces the racial representation
burdens of later generation employees. The conduct of these employees will be
less racially representative, giving them greater autonomy to navigate the
workplace and a greater sense of entitlement and belonging.
H. Mentorship
Success within most large bureaucratic organizations requires access to
tacit information about both the organization (for example, how to negotiate
institutional politics) and the job (for example, how to communicate with
clients).50 The defining characteristic of this tacit information is that it has to
49. See Yelnosky, supra note 48, at 1390-99 (describing the dynamics of tokenism).
50. In the law firm context, this information is described in David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu
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be conveyed in person. What this means, more specifically, is that senior
employees have to take junior employees under their wing. The ideal situation
is one in which senior employees "group mentor" junior employees, which is to
say they constitute themselves as a group--a network of information-for the
juniors.51 This network would then provide juniors with invaluable official and
unofficial knowledge about the institution, its governance structure, and power
brokers.
The reasons that people of color typically do not have access to this kind
of institutional knowledge are complicated; the answer is not simply intentional
racial animus.5 2 Part of the problem may be that scarce mentorship resources
are allocated to those with whom the mentors are most comfortable, and these
may tend to be juniors of the same race and gender as the mentors.
5 3
Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional
Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REv. 496 (1996). See generally Pamela J. Smith, Failing to Mentor
Sapphire: The Actionability of Blocking Black Women from Initiating Mentoring Relationships,
10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 373,389-90 (2000); MARGO MURRAY & MARNA A. OwEN, BEYOND
THE MYTHS AND MAGIC OFMENTORING (1991); Scott E. Seibert et al., A Social Capital Theory
of Career Success, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 219 (2001).
51. Put differently, the concept is that individuals rely on not just a single mentor for
developmental support, but on a "relationship constellation." Monica C. Higgins & Kathy E.
Kram, Reconceptualizing Mentoring at Work: A Developmental Network Perspective, 26
AcAD. MGMT. REV. 264, 264 (2001).
52. David Wilkins describes the importance of having access to networks that can provide
such information in the context of the story of Lawrence Mungin, a black lawyer who makes a
number of strategic errors in his attempt to move up the corporate hierarchy. See David B.
Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1924, 1966 (1999) (book review)
(describing how Mungin cut himself off from possible sources of information about the law
firm's informal processes in the black community). The importance of having access to social
networks forms the basis for much of Glenn Loury's writing about the economics of
discrimination. See, e.g., Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond
Market Interactions, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 119-21 (arguing that social networks,
which largely determine one's access to resources, allow past discrimination to persist over time
and can have deleterious impacts on skills among minorities and significantly contribute to
racial inequalities).
53. See DAVID A. THoMAs & JOHN J. GABARRO, BREAKING THROUGH: THE MAKING OF
MINORrIY EXECUTIVES IN CORPORATE AMERICA 26 (1999) (observing, in the context of a study
of the difficulties that black executives face in advancing up the corporate hierarchy, that white
men often find it more comfortable working with other white men). See generally Raymond A.
Friedman & Brooks Holtom, The Effects of Network Groups on Minority Employee Turnover
Intentions, 41 HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 405 (2002) (describing the background literature on the
barriers to mentorship for minority employers and finding that the presence of "network groups"
can help alleviate that problem); David A. Thomas, Racial Dynamics in Cross-Race
Developmental Relationships, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 169 (1993) (describing the barriers that racial
differences can erect to the creation of effective mentorship relationships). On the importance
of mentorship relationships for lawyers in general and minority lawyers in particular, see
generally Monica C. Higgins & David A. Thomas, Constellations and Careers: Toward
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An alternative explanation is that tacit information is often conveyed in
informal settings-settings in which people are relatively comfortable
engaging in office gossip about the ins and outs of workplace politics. People
of color may have limited access to these settings, again because after-work
socialization tends to be same-race.54
The first generation of minority successes occurred despite minimal
access to the foregoing information networks. In some cases the success was a
result of exceptional skill, in other cases it was luck, and in still other
(presumably rare) cases there was some nonminority who was willing to reach
outside an established ingroup to provide mentorship and network
opportunities to a minority prot6g6.5 The workplace presence and success of
the first generation means that succeeding generations of minorities will have
access to at least a minimal amount of mentorship and networks, reducing the
need to rely on exceptional skill, luck, benevolence, and outside connections.
Understanding the Effects of Multiple Developmental Relationships, 22 J. ORG. BEHAv. 223
(2001) (finding that a lawyer's portfolio of mentoring relationships is crucial in determining the
occupational path he or she takes); David Thomas & Monica Higgins, Mentoring and the
Boundaryless Career: Lessons from the Minority Experience, in THE BOUNDARYLESS CAREER:
A NEw EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPLE FOR A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL ERA 268 (Michael B. Arthur &
Denise M. Rousseau eds., 1996) (describing how minority employees, who can be at a
disadvantage in terms of accessing intrafirm networks of information, are sometimes able to
reach outside their own firms' race-based networks of information).
54. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 50, at 569-70 (arguing that black associates at large
firms often have a difficult time of establishing mentoring relationships necessary to be privy to
tacit information partly because white mentors prefer associates who remind them of
themselves); see also Nijole V. Benokraitis & Joe R. Feagin, Sex Discrimination: Subtle and
Covert, in DowN TO EARTH SOCIOLOGY 334, 334-35 (James M. Henslin ed., 7th ed. 1993)
(describing the informational inadequacy problem that arises as a result of being excluded from
informal social groups at the workplace).
55. See, e.g., Jonathan Kaufman, Inside Outsiders: As Blacks Rise High in the Executive
Suite, CEO is Often Jewish, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1998, at Al (describing a mentoring
relationship between two Jewish partners at a major New York law firm and a young black
associate who later became a partner). As Thomas describes, there are significant barriers to
such cross group mentorship. Thomas, supra note 53. What Wilkins interestingly finds in the
law firm context is that the first generation of minority successes often came in laterally, after
what was usually a distinguished career in public service. David B. Wilkins, Partners Without
Power?: A Preliminary Look at Black Partners in Corporate Law Firms, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY
LEGAL ETHics 15, 30-31 (1999). Wilkins argues in a more recent paper that minority associates
and partners, because of their reduced access to intrafirm networks, often have to tap into
networks outside their firm-networks that often involve public service to the larger minority
community. David B. Wilkins, Doing Well by Doing Good? The Role of Public Service in the
Careers of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (2004). In other words, they
did not succeed in the usual manner. The fact that they came in laterally at a later stage,
however, usually meant that they did not have a large store of institution-specific tacit
knowledge to help their successors. Indeed, despite their partner status, they were usually
struggling for survival themselves. Id. at 35-47.
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Having set forth the results that many of us hope will accrue from the
successes of the first generations of minorities in the workplace-in other
words, the dynamics of the "trickle down" effect-the next question is: What
are the characteristics of the minorities most likely to succeed? This is the
subject of Part Ill. Engaging this question allows us to explore whether
successful racial minorities are likely to perform the ameliorative functions
relating to stereotype negation, racial monitoring, racial accountability, racial
comfort work, tokenism, and mentorship.
III. Those Most Likely To Succeed
Starting with the assumption that racial minorities are subject to negative
stereotypes-negative presumptions about work ethic, loyalty, trustworthiness,
and collegiality, among other things-we walk through a set of three simple
predictions about the types of minorities likely to succeed in predominantly
white corporate cultures.5 6 As will become clear, we model success as a
function of choices. We do so not to deny the institutional constraints of being
a person of color in a modem corporate culture. Indeed, it is precisely because
we recognize these constraints that we focus on choice-how minorities
exercise the limited discretion they have with respect to work assignments-
and on what we call racial agency-how senior and presumably successful
minorities manage the presence of other junior minorities within the
corporation. We argue that there is a relationship between being a successful
racial type and the exercise of racial agency. More particularly, our claim is
56. This subject has been the focus of our joint research over the past few years. See
generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 38 (examining the use of workplace identities by
minorities to negate the effects of stereotyping). For other research on how individuals
negotiate their identities as a function of discriminatory perceptions in the workplace, see
generally W.E. Douglas Creed & Maureen A. Scully, Songs of Ourselves: Employees'
Deployment of Social Identity in Workplace Encounters, 9 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 391 (2000); Robin
J. Ely, The Role of Dominant Identity and Experience in Organizational Work on Diversity, in
DIVERSITY IN WORK TEAMS: RESEARCH PARADIGMS FOR A CHANGING WORKPLACE 161 (Susan E.
Jackson & Marian N. Ruderman eds., 1995); Roberts, supra note 41. More broadly, on the
concerns that drive an employee's choices regarding an image construction in the workplace,
see generally PAUL ROSENFELD Er AL., IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS (1995);
Susan J. Ashford et al., Out on a Limb: The Role of Context and Impression Management in
Selling Gender-Equity Issues, 43 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 23 (1998); Caroline Bartel & Jane Dutton,
Ambiguous Organizational Memberships: Constructing Organizational Identities in
Interactions with Others, in SOCIAL IDENTITY PROCESSES IN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXTS 115
(Michael A. Hogg & Deborah J. Terry eds., 2001); Erica Gabrielle Foldy, Being All That You
Can Be: Identities and Interactions in Organizations (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No.
03-117, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
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that the racial types who race their way to the top of the corporate hierarchy,
"successful racial types," are not likely to exercise racial agency to "lift [others]
as they climb.0 7 In order for us to substantiate this claim, we need to first
explicitly articulate the nature or identity characteristics of successful racial
types. We do so below.
A. Risk-Taking, Luck, and Overconfidence
The simplest models of employee promotion are production-centered.
According to these models, the employee who produces the most widgets at the
cheapest cost will be promoted. The theory is that the employer is competing
with other employers to produce the cheapest and best widgets; therefore, the
employer who does not promote the best widget-producers will lose them to the
job market and ultimately be driven out of business.
The reality in most large organizations is quite different. Employee
performance is often difficult to measure; moreover, many corporate tasks are
structured so that employees are required to exercise discretion. If, as we are
suggesting, minority employees are often subject to stereotypes that they are less
capable, the question emerges as to how they will exercise this discretion. We
contend that there is an incentive for minorities to exercise discretion to
counteract or to undermine the negative stereotype about competence. One way
for them to do so is to assume primary responsibility for high-risk tasks, tasks that
are well beyond their skill level and that have the potential to make them stand
out among their peers. High-risk projects, when performed successfully, yield
high returns. Taking on and successfully completing a difficult project that
people at low levels of experience do not usually attempt might catch the attention
of the corporate leaders and cause them to rethink their racial assumptions. It
makes sense, then, for people of color seeking advancement to make this high-
risk choice.
This will not necessarily be the case for whites. Because whites are not
subject to negative stereotypes, they will experience less pressure to take on high-
risk assignments. If we assume that whites and nonwhites are in a competitive
race to the top of the corporation, one way for minorities to gain a competitive
edge, or at least mitigate a racial disadvantage, is to perform high-risk tasks. And,
indeed, there is some suggestion in the employment discrimination literature
that the people of color who are most likely to succeed in the corporate
context (apart from the true superstars) are those who (a) take big risks and
57. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (showing the extent to which this concept has
permeated the general consciousness).
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(b) are lucky in that the big risks payoff.58 While we agree that risk-taking and
luck help to explain minority corporate success, we believe that a third factor or
condition plays a role as well: overconfidence. If the firm attributes an
employee's success to luck, the firm probably will not promote that employee.
Nor is the firm likely to look favorably upon excessive risk-taking behavior,
particularly if the firm bears the costs of the failures. Consequently, the employee
who is seeking to outperform his colleagues cannot stop at taking higher risk
gambles. He must also be able to persuade the firm's decisionmakers that the
successes that result from these gambles were earned and not the result of luck.
Likely, excessively self-confident minorities will be persuasive on this score.
The firm will perceive these employees to be "authentic" in their claim that
their success was a function of talent, not luck.59 In sum, risk-taking, luck,
58. See, e.g., Carbado & Gulati, supra note 38, at 1289-90 (describing how the dynamic
can occur in everyday workplace image management choices); David Chamy & G. Mitu Gulati,
Efficiency- Wages, Tournaments, and Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination
Law for "High-Level" Jobs, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57,79 (1998) (explaining the structural
dynamic that produces an incentive for minority workers to take on high-risk gambles); Wilkins
& Gulati, supra note 50, at 522-23 (explaining this dynamic in the context of law firm
promotions). Although not often explicitly described as a high-risk gamble, scholars in the
gender discrimination area have also identified the same dynamic as occurring when women
employees have to attempt to negate the stereotypes of being meek but then risk
overcompensating and activating the other negative stereotype of being unfeminine or pushy.
See, e.g., VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY So SLOw? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 133-37(1998) (re-
examining the tradeoffs of appearing masculine or feminine); cf. Carol T. Miller & Anna M.
Meyers, Compensating for Prejudice: How Heavyweight People (and Others) Control
Outcomes Despite Prejudice, in PREJUDICE: THE TARGET'S PERSPECTIVE 191, 212 (Janet K.
Swim & Charles Stangor eds., 1998) (describing how the attempt to compensate for negative
stereotypes can sometimes result in overcompensation where someone talks too fast, laughs too
loud, or comes on too strong, and ends up putting off other people instead of pleasing them).
Finally, for those outsider employees who try to demonstrate affinity for the dominant group,
there is also the danger of being perceived as a traitor by their own group. See Nyla R.
Branscombe & Naomi Ellemers, Coping with Group-Based Discrimination: Individualistic
Versus Group-Level Strategies, in PREJUDICE: THE TARGET'S PERSPECTIVE 243, 258 (Janet K.
Swim & Charles Stangor eds., 1998) (discussing the long term risks and benefits that
individuals who remove themselves from their group face).
The dynamic described in the text is particularly likely to occur in up-or-out settings where
both the rewards for success and the penalties for failure are large. If, however, the penalty for
failure in that partner game is not large, then the high-risk dynamic described in the text can be
reversed in a way that those with an a priori lower likelihood of success are pushed towards
excessive risk aversion. In law firms, even though there is supposedly an "up-or-out" system,
the "out" part is not generally a high penalty because those who fail in obtaining partnership can
generally get "high" or "efficiency" wage jobs elsewhere.
59. On the importance of authenticity for effective impression management, see Roberts,
supra note 41 (manuscript at 33-36) (citing to studies to support the point that those who
demonstrate authenticity are likely to be more effective in their impression management
strategies).
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and overconfidence are three important and interrelated factors in the determining
whether minorities will ascend the corporate hierarchy.
B. Team Work and Racial Fit
As previously discussed, a large percentage of corporate work is
performed in the context of teams.6° Thus, one's ability to climb the corporate
ladder is a function of one's competence as a team worker and one's reputation
as a team player. There is a growing body of literature suggesting that
corporate leaders likely presume that people of color will not fit comfortably
within team-oriented environments. 61 The presumption, more specifically, is
that people of color are different, that their loyalties reside outside of the
institution, and that they have suspicions about, feel uncomfortable around, and
are also distrusting of their white counterparts. To the extent that people of
color are aware of this negative presumption regarding their capacity for
institutional fit, there is an incentive for them to demonstrate not simply that
they can, in fact, teamwork,62 but that they can do so more effectively than
60. See supra Part II.D (discussing the role of trust in teamwork).
61. The development of open, trusting, and genuine relationships is crucial for the setting
up of effective teams. See Amy Edmonson, Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in
Work Teams, 44 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 350,354-55 (1999) (stating the importance of trust on the team
level rather than just among team members). There are two bodies of research that bear on this
point that racial minorities are likely to have difficulty in matching up to their white male
counterparts on these criteria. First, research shows that perceived similarity and ingroup-ness
positively influences the likelihood of trust and liking, crucial precursors for setting up effective
teams. See generally Roderic M. Kramer et al., Collective Trust and Collective Action: The
Decision to Trust as a Social Decision, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OFTHEORY AND
RESEARCH 357 (Roderic M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996); Charlan Jeanne Nemeth,
Differential Contributions of Majority and Minority Influence, 93 PSYCHOL. REv. 23 (1986);
Jeffrey T. Polzer et al., Capitalizing on Diversity: Interpersonal Congruence in Small Work
Groups, 47 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 296 (2002). And then there is a large body of research on the types
of negative stereotypes racial minorities face that, depending on the minority identity in
question, can include laziness, untrustworthiness, lack of intelligence, lack of creativity, and
foreignness. See generally Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: TheirAutomatic and
Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989); Sandy Jeanquart-
Barone, Implications of Racial Diversity in the Superior-Subordinate Relationship, 26 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 935 (1996); Lisa Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Reactions to a Black
Professional: Motivated Inhibition and Activation of Conflicting Stereotypes, 77 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 885 (1999); Cha & Roberts, supra note 41.
62. See Francis J. Flynn et al., Getting to Know You: The Influence of Personality on
Impressions and Performance of Demographically Different People in Organizations, 46
ADMIN. Sci. Q. 414,419 (2001) (finding that demographically different persons who are better
able to self monitor are more likely to be able to succeed in workplace settings).
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their white (typically male) counterparts.63  To put the point more
controversially, there is an incentive for minorities to prove that they can be
better insiders than white men. And those who exhibit the greatest insider-
group affinity are most likely to receive promotions.
C. Managing Other Minorities
The reality of the modem workplace is that racial minorities are going to
be present. The "racial problem" for firms is no longer how to keep people of
color out but rather (a) making a determination as to which ones to let in and
(b) developing strategies for managing them. In other words, firms are going to
want to hire and promote some minorities. As suggested earlier with respect to
hiring, because of concerns about racial comfort and institutional fit,64 firms
will screen for racial palatability and against performative racial difference.
Concretely and employing blacks as an example, firms will hire people who
63. Along these lines, a number of commentators recommend that outsiders-those with
different social identities---de-emphasize those social identity differences and instead emphasize
work-related commonalities so as to achieve cohesion and unity at the workplace. See generally
Scott Allison & Caryn E. Herlocker, Constructing Impressions in Demographically Diverse
Organizational Settings, 37 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIsT 637 (1994); Jennifer A. Chatman et al.,
Being Different Yet Feeling Similar: The Influence of Demographic Composition and
Organizational Culture on Work Processes and Outcomes, 43 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 749 (1998); John
F. Dovidio et al., Reducing Contemporary Prejudice: Combating Explicit and Implicit Bias at
the Individual and Intergroup Level, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION (Stuart
Oskamp ed., 2000).
There is a body of research that finds that the above prescriptions do not always need to
hold for diverse teams to function effectively. If the organizations themselves set up structures
that value social identity differences, then employees will feel less of a need to adopt the kinds
of strategies mentioned above. Instead, their differences can, in some cases, be harnessed to
achieve productivity gains. See Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work:
The Effects of Diversity Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 229, 240-43 (2001) [hereinafter Ely & Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work] (examining the
potential value of diverse individual cultural experiences to the group process); Robin J. Ely &
David A. Thomas, Team Learning and the Racial Diversity-Performance Link 26-31 (Aug.
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Washington and Lee Law Review) (analyzing the
impact of racial learning environments on performance measures); see also Manuela Barreto &
Naomi Ellemers, The Impact of Respect Versus Neglect of Self-Identities on Identification and
Group Loyalty, - PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 14-
15, on file with Washington and Lee Law Review) (finding that a person's identity
presentational choices, including which aspects of their identity to emphasize and which aspects
to de-emphasize, are a function of how the organizational culture treats those different
identities).
64. See supra Part I.E (arguing that racial minorities bear the burden of making whites
comfortable with the minority presence).
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are phenotypically but unconventionally black-that is to say, people who
"look" but do not "act" black.
With respect to promotion, firms likely will have an additional concern, a
concern that derives from what we call residual racial difference.
Notwithstanding the firm's best screening efforts, the minorities that the firm
hires will still be different. They cannot perform their way completely outside
their racial identity; they will always be intelligible as nonwhite-less nonwhite
than other people of color, to be sure, but nevertheless nonwhite. Firms will
want to promote people of color who can help the firm manage this residual
racial difference or racial excess. A crucial element of that management task
will be to devise a mechanism both to provide and to receive information across the
groups. Minorities in key management positions can be effective conduits for this
information. There is an incentive, then, for firms to promote those minorities with the
capacity to help them better manage and communicate with the larger group of
minority workers in the workplace.
This management concern may also extend to minority groups outside the firm.
If a firm needs to cultivate customers or clients in minority communities, and there is a
perception that minority employees are better able to serve as conduits, there is an
incentive for the firm to promote at least some minority employees who can assist in
managing these external relationships.
D. Summary
Our point of departure for this Part was to model employee success as a function
of employee choice. We did so to identify the kind of choices minority employees will
have to make to ascend the corporate hierarchy and to reveal how the exercise of those
choices produces a particular type of racial subjectivity-a person of color who (a) is
both a risk-taker and overly confident, (b) is a team player, and (c) is perceived by the
employer to have the capacity to manage other nonwhites. The question is now
whether this type of racial minority is likely to perform the discrimination-ameliorative
tasks outlined in Part I1. We now turn directly to this question.
IV The Likelihood of Ameliorative Tasks Being Performed
Assuming that the minority employee actually races her way to the top of the
corporation, the ameliorative tasks set forth in Part II seem easy to perform.
Indeed, many of these tasks get "performed" simply as a function of the minority
employee's presence at the upper echelons of the workplace. But once one takes
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into account the significant behavioral incentives that confront minority
employees, incentives that derive from the perception of negative stereotyping,
the racial "difficulty" of performing discrimination-ameliorative tasks becomes
more apparent. Below we indicate the precise nature of this difficulty with respect
to each of the ameliorative tasks we discussed in Part I1.
A. Stereotype Negation
We begin our analysis of the trickle down benefits via a discussion of stereotype
negation. We suggested that there are two stereotype-negating strategies that senior
minorities can employ--racial group negation strategies and individual identity
negation strategies--and that the employment of either or both of these strategies
would racially improve the corporation forjunior minorities. However, as we explain
below, there is a greater incentive for seniors to perform individual identity negation
strategies than group negation strategies, and the former do little to improve the
advancement opportunities of junior minorities.
1. Racial Group Negation Strategies
a. The Difficulties of Direct Intervention
Imagine that Marco, a Latino, is interested in convincing the
decisionmakers at his firm that Latinos are not lazy and that they are just as
competent as whites. He could, in the context of a hiring meeting, simply
remind his colleagues of the way stereotypes work and suggest that they be
careful not to allow their decisionmaking to be informed by those stereotypes.
This need not be done in a confrontational manner. Indeed, Marco might even
employ humor to raise the racial consciousness.65
This kind of direct intervention-speaking out about racial stereotypes in
the context of a hiring meeting-is not likely to occur, however. To understand
why, one has to conceptualize the hiring meeting as a high visibility moment, a
moment in which one's institutional identity is salient. Recall now the
composite of the people of color who are most likely to ascend the corporate
hierarchy; these people will probably be overconfident about their
abilities, be willing to take high levels of risk, and be able to credibly
demonstrate an affinity for the dominant group. Given the nature of the
65. See Cha & Roberts, supra note 41, at 6-9 (observing the different strategies used to
negate stereotypes, including the humor strategy).
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modern corporation (complex hierarchies with decentralization), high
visibility moments are few and far between. 66 They are occasions, therefore, in
which an incentive exists for employees, especially nonwhite employees, to
engage in identity management strategies to positively construct their individual
institutional identity. This incentive renders the hiring meeting a suboptimal
occasion for Marco to confront authority-even via humor. 67 Likely Marco
will want to use the hiring meeting to solidify the impression of him as an
affable, and not a hostile, person of color who is loyal to the firm and
committed to its institutional projects.
One might reasonably raise the question as to why Marco's risk-taking
tendencies would not result in him being interventionist. Being silent in the
context of a hiring meeting in which the operation of stereotypes could limit
opportunities for people of color hardly seems like something a risk-taker
would do. But note that Marco's risk-taking is in respect to job assignments,
not overall institutional politics. He engages in risk-taking only to the extent
that he perceives a stereotype negation payoff. And none seems to flow from
admonishing one's colleagues to be careful not to draw on stereotypes when
making hiring decisions.
One may conclude from the foregoing discussion that Marco has two
choices: (1) not speaking out about stereotypes, a passive move that leaves his
racially affable institutional identity in tact, or (2) speaking out against the
operation of racial stereotypes, an active move with the potential to disrupt his
"positive" racial image. However, Marco has a third option: to very subtly
sanction his colleagues' utilization of stereotypes. In the context of the
meeting, he might simply say something like:
Some of you have expressed concerns about the small number of people of
color-especially Latinos-in the pool. One of you made the point that we
cannot have another year in which we fail to hire at least one Latino. As a
Latino myself and a member of this firm for over twelve years, I would
certainly like to see others at this firm. But I don't think we should lower
our standards, and I don't think we should be paternalistic. Let's not
forget that, up until two years ago, there were three other Latinos in this
firm. Two left to pursue other opportunities and one was denied
partnership for good reason. He simply was not a team-player, and he did
not have the best work ethic. That's not a bad racial record. Could it be
better? Perhaps. I would need to do some more thinking about it. To be
clear: none of this is to say that we should be unmindful of the possibility
66. See Carbado & Gulati, Conversations at Work, supra note 42, at 103-07 (discussing
the concept of high visibility).
67. Cf. DERRICK A. BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT
PROTESTOR 9-25 (1994) (providing "models for confrontation").
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that our hiring produces a racially disparate impact. What I am
suggesting here is that there is no indication that this is the case. From
where I sit, then, I think we should stop beating ourselves up about this. I
say all of this as a Latino who is deeply concerned about the well being of
Latinos inside and outside of thisfirm.
Marco's speaking out in this way solidifies the impression of him as a
team-player who is loyal to the institution, invested in merit, and willing to
subordinate racial group identity politics for the good of the firm. His
colleagues could read his comments to say, vis-t-vis hiring, the firm is doing
nothing wrong; to the extent there are few Latinos at the firm, that is a function
of the limited number of qualified Latinos, not racial discrimination. If so,
Marco will have demonstrated to his white colleagues in power (a) a lack of
resentment about the possibility of their holding negative racial stereotypes, and
(b) an affirmative belief in the meritocratic nature of the workplace.68 In all of
this Marco remains authentic as a Latino. At no time does he disidentify with
the identity category "Latino" or with the idea of race or racial organization.
Marco's intervention could signal an even stronger commitment to the
firm and a weaker commitment to racial group identification. Marco could
make the point that, given affirmative action, it is particularly important to pay
attention to standards when hiring minorities. This might translate into Marco
applying a higher level of scrutiny to minority applicants; he may even insist
that marginal minority candidates not be hired, even where marginal candidates
from other groups are hired. If Marco adopts this strategy, it will likely allay
any concerns about his institutional commitment. But it will also provide those
colleagues with an external justification for their negative actions regarding
minority issues. For example, it is a lot easier for a law firm to explain its
defense of some egregiously discriminatory position being advanced by a client
if it is able to assert that its minority lawyers insisted, on the grounds of
principle, that they not deny that client representation. Along similar
lines, it would help the firm defend a discrimination case filed by a
68. See Elijah Anderson, The Social Situation of the Black Executive: Black and White
Identities in the Corporate World, in THE CULTURAL TERRITORIES OF RACE: BLACK AND WHITE
BOUNDARIES 3, 9 (Michle Larnont ed., 1999) (describing how many successful blacks
internalize conceptions of the organization as a meritocracy and are willing to blame whatever
bad experiences they have had on aberrant individuals); cf. David A. Thomas, Diversity as
Strategy, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept. 2004, at 98, 102 (noting, in a description of IBM's recent
strategic initiative to improve diversity at the firm, how members of the black task force
advocated for a conservative approach to diversity because of the fear that they would be
perceived as asking for "unearned preferences, and, even worse, might encourage the stereotype
that blacks are less capable").
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former employee of color if the people who led the charge for the denial of
promotion were themselves members of a minority group.
Whether, in the above hypothetical, Marco would go so far as to lead the
charge against hiring another Latino is not clear. What is clear is that there is
little incentive for him to employ a direct interventionist strategy to negate
racial stereotypes at the group level. That strategy carries the potential cost of
disrupting the impression of him as an affable racial minority and a good
institutional citizen.69
b. Indirect Intervention
Is there an indirect way in which Marco might attempt to negate racial
stereotypes at the group level? The most obvious way for Marco to do so is via
his own work performance. More specifically, the quantity and quality of
Marco's work may suggest to the firm's decisionmakers not only that Marco is
a smart, hardworking, and conscientious worker but also that these
characteristics apply to Latinos as a group. Marco's work performance might
very well be outstanding enough to perform that signification. But,
69. On a related note, experimental research shows that when outsider group members are
allowed even minimal entrance into the dominant group (that has a higher status), these outsider
group members tend to strengthen identification with the group into which they seek entrance.
See generally Naomi Ellemers, The Influence of Socio-Structural Variables on Identity
Management Strategies, 4 EUR. REv. Soc. PSYCHOL. 27 (1993); Stephen Wright et al.,
Responding to Membership in a Disadvantaged Group: From Acceptance to Collective
Protest, 58 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 994 (1990). All outsider group members,
however, do not react to the opportunities for individual advancement versus group
advancement equally. Those outsiders with lower levels of identification with the outsider
group and who contest their being placed in the lower status group, as one might expect, are
more willing to leave their fellow outsiders behind if presented with an opportunity for
individual advancement. See Branscombe & Ellemers, supra note 58, at 245, 257 (discussing
studies about the identification levels of group members). The result then can be that these
peripheral outsider group members (who are the ones most likely to advance) take on strategies
that serve the interests of the dominant group and do not best advance the interests of their
marginalized outsider group. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 18, at 1813 n.202 (citing to
research by Stephen Wright and others in making this point); Brenda Major et al., Reducing
Prejudice: The Target's Perspective, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 211 (Stuart
Oskamp ed., 2000) (discussing how people may not respond to social identity threats or
negative stereotyping if the emotional energy required to respond to correcting those
problematic perceptions is too high). See generally Michle Lamont, Everyday Anti-Racism:
Competence and Religion in the Cultural Repertoire of the African-American Elite (May 3,
2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (finding that
successful and elite African Americans, while often espousing racial solidarity, often adopt
strategies of self-presentation that are not truly inclusive, but instead only allow the
advancement of a few minority group members to the privileged position of insiders).
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presumably, Latinos who can perform at this level-in other words, true
superstars-are in short supply.
Assuming that Marco is not a superstar, he can still attempt to negate
group-based stereotypes through the choices he makes about work. That is,
Marco can be even more high-risk with respect to work assignments than he
otherwise would be. The problem with this strategy is this: the greater
Marco's risk-taking, the greater the possibility of large failure, failure which
would confirm, rather than disrupt, racial stereotypes. The problem is
compounded if other Latinos (or other minorities) in the firm adopt this
strategy. The failure rate of the group will rise, creating the overall impression
that Latinos or minorities are irrational and rash. The end result is an
exacerbation rather than an elimination of negative racial presumptions.
Another problem with group-based negation strategies based on work
performance is that most jobs do not involve tasks where the production of each
employee can be separated and ranked against that of others. Instead, most
high-level jobs tend to involve production in teams and fuzzy individual
outputs. This limits the extent to which any one individual can, through the
quality of his work, challenge racial stereotypes at the group level. At best,
such individuals can preempt the application of the negative stereotype to
themselves. Returning to our hypothetical, although Marco's work
performance may have the potential to rebut assumptions about his competence
and work ethic, it will be inadequate to the task to rebut negative assumptions
about Latinos as a whole.
2. Individual Identity Negation Strategies
Given both the cost and difficulties of negating stereotypes at the group
level, minorities may attempt to disrupt stereotypes at the individual level. The
problem with this strategy is that it allows the firm's decisionmakers to engage
in what we call racial exceptionalism. Consider Marco again. If Marco
employs an individual identity strategy and succeeds, the institutional message
would be: Marco may be a Latino, but he is not like other Latinos. He is
exceptional. Therefore, the stereotypes we hold about Latinos should not be
applied to Marco. Note that the firm has not revised its impressions of Latinos,
only its impression of Marco. The problem is potentially worse. To the extent
that Marco's individual stereotype negation strategy takes the form of racial
distancing and disidentification, they exacerbate rather than ameliorate
negative stereotypes about Latinos as a group. Assume, for example, that
Marco might inform his majority colleagues that he is frustrated
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with the low standards of work among his fellow minorities and their failure
to act as team players.70 There is little reason to conclude that this individual
identity negation strategy will trickle down to benefit junior people of color.
70. There is a large literature on "outsiders" using distancing strategies to advance in the
workplace. These distancing strategies can come in at least two forms. First, there can be
distancing in that the employee might try to emphasize aspects of her identity that are the
nonminority aspects. In other words, she may try to make her race less salient. So, if her
colleagues are Catholic or from the same college that she went to or if they all play chess, she
may try to emphasize those commonalities and deemphasize the racial and gender differentials.
Alternatively, the minority employee might try to exceptionalize herself and comfort her
colleagues about the negative views that they have about minorities. So, she may tell them that
she also thinks that it is a problem that so many minorities are lazy and obsessed with race
issues. Of the two strategies discussed above, the second one is obviously more harmful to the
group's interest (because it involves the active confirmation of stereotypes). But the first
strategy is also problematic in that it involves deemphasizing (making invisible) the race of the
successful minority and, therefore, reducing the chances that success will be used by others to
revise their views about the racial group.
Roberts articulates the distinction that we make above in terms of "assimilation" versus
"decategorization." See Roberts, supra note 41 (manuscript at 25-26) (explaining the concepts
of "assimilation" and "decategorization"). Assimilation refers to emphasizing distinctiveness
from one's social group and similarities to the more dominant group. "Passing" is an extreme
form of assimilationist behavior. Decategorization also involves reducing the salience of one's
racial identity, this time by emphasizing the nonstigmatized portions of one's identity, such as
one's identity as an engineer or sports fan or UCLA graduate. Similarly, avoiding issues of race
in one's conversations is another method of achieving decategorization. See Thomas, supra
note 53, at 178-80 (discussing how minorities may sometimes suppress race in order to develop
relationships with mentors who are uncomfortable with racial issues). On both sets of strategies
in a variety of contexts, including race, gender, and sexual orientation, see generally Donna
Chrobot-Mason et al., Sexual Identity Management Strategies: An Exploration of Antecedents
and Consequences, 45 SEx ROLES 321 (2001); John F. Dovido et al., Reducing Contemporary
Prejudice: Combating Explicit and Implicit Bias at the Individual and Intergroup Level, in
REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 137 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000); Naomi Ellemers et
al., Self and Social Identity, 53 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 161 (2002); Teresa LaFromboise et al.,
Psychological Impact of Biculturalism: Evidence and Theory, in THE CULTURE AND
PSYCHOLOGY READER 489 (Nancy Rule Goldberger & Jody Bennet Veroffeds., 1995); Robin J.
Ely, The Effects of Organizational Demographics and Social Identity on Relationships Among
Professional Women, 39 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 203 (1994) [hereinafter Ely, The Effects of
Organizational Demographics]; Robin J. Ely, The Power in Demography: Women's Social
Constructions of Gender Identity at Work, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 589 (1995); Laurie A. Rudman,
Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs and Benefits of Counterstereotypical
Impression Management, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629 (1998); Laurie A. Rudman
& Peter Glick, Feminized Management and Backlash Toward Agentic Women: The Hidden
Costs to Women of a Kinder, Gentler Image of Middle Managers, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1004 (1999).
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B. Racial Monitoring
Recall our assumption that the presence of successful minorities would
71have the effect of racially monitoring the institution. White colleagues, we
posited, would be more likely to be conscious of racial issues in making
decisions in the presence of their successful minority colleagues than they
would in their absence. This accountability effect could impact both the firm's
labor market decisions, including those relating to promotion and hiring, and its
nonlabor interactions with the outside world, including choices about what
products to manufacture, how to market them, and others. Our aim here is to
question this racial monitoring assumption.
Imagine that Marco has just been promoted to partner. Assume that hiring
decisions are made by partners, that Marco is about to participate in his first
hiring meeting, and that he is only one of two minorities present. Will Marco's
presence have a monitoring effect? There are several reasons to answer that
question in the negative. First, Marco has likely participated in numerous
socialization rituals in which his racial palatability was both demanded and
supplied. Indeed, Marco's very success within the firm was probably a
function of his capacity to practice racial comfort and individual identity
72stereotype negation. Members of the partnership, then, would not feel
excessively racially policed by Marco's presence.
Second, to the extent that this is Marco's first partnership meeting about
hiring, there is an incentive for him to use the moment to assure his partners
that his status as a partner will inaugurate a change neither in his institutional
nor in his racial identity. In other words, Marco might view this meeting as a
high visibility moment in which he, as a partner, needs to demonstrate
institutional fit, loyalty, and team orientation.73 Further, he would want to find
a way to convey the idea that he is not interested in disrupting the selection
71. See supra Part II.B (discussing how the presence of minorities affects decisions
throughout the firm).
72. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 19, at 1803-06 (suggesting that firms employ
selection mechanisms to hire people of color who they believe will provide racial comfort).
73. In her classic work, Kanter describes this (in the gender context) as women being
subject to "loyalty tests" where, as a requirement of fitting in, women are expected to put down
other women on occasion. Kanter describes three ways in which women can pass loyalty tests:
they can let slide biased statements about other women, they can allow for jokes about women
to be made without resistances, and they can accept their situation. See KANTER, supra note 48,
at 227-29 (explaining loyalty tests); see also Ramit Mizrahi, Note, "Hostility to the Presence of
Women": Why Women Undermine Each Other in the Workplace and the Consequences for
Title VII, 113 YALE L.J. 1579, 1602 (2004) (suggesting the continued applicability of Kanter's
work to the gender discrimination context today).
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and socialization processes that (racially) produced him. This would send a
message to the partners that Marco is willing to help the firm "manage" other
racial minorities and residual racial differences. The foregoing suggests there is
reason to believe that Marco's presence would not operate as a racial monitor.
This conclusion is not undermined by the risk-taking aspects of Marco's
identity, which, again, is (a) directed at work assignments and (b) a part of a
broader strategy to disconfirm or negate racial stereotypes.
C. Racial Accountability
Another assumption we made about minority survivors of the promotion
tournament is that they would produce racial accountability. The idea, again, is
that the presence of these minorities would require the firm to account for-
explain or justify-apparent racial inequities in the firm.74 The reasons
articulated above as to why senior people of color may not produce racial
monitoring also explain why racial accountability may not occur. In short, the
firm would have an expectation that the people of color it promotes (a) are
committed to the institutional norms of the firm, even norms that have disparate
racial impacts such as those relating to hiring and promotion, and (b) would
have an investment in demonstrating that commitment.75  As a result,
74. See supra Part ll.C (explaining the concept of racial accountability).
75. Patricia Hewlin and Ashley Rosette, in a recent paper, argue that even white male
employees will often feel pressured to avoid pointing out instances of discrimination (even
while thinking that it is wrong) so as to avoid being stigmatized as nonteam players. See
generally Patricia Faison Hewlin & Ashleigh Shelby Rosette, Stigma Avoidance: A Precursor
to Workplace Discrimination (Aug. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). Hewlin and Rosette draw on a larger literature on organizational silence.
For examples of articles in this area, see generally Frances J. Milliken et al., An Exploratory
Study of Employee Silence: Issues That Employers Don't Communicate Upward and Why, 40 J.
MGMT. STUD. 1453 (2003); C.C. Pinder & Karen P. Harlos, Employee Silence: Quiescence and
Acquiescence as Responses to Perceived Injustice, 20 RES. HUM. RESOURCES & PERSONNEL
MGMT. 331 (2001); Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowers in Organizations:
Dissidents or Reformers?, 9 RES. ORG. BEHAv. 321 (L.L. Cummings & Barry M. Straw eds.,
1987). In the context of studying the disclosure securities practices of organizations,
Langevoort taps the management literature to understand how and why it is that lower level
employees are often reluctant to report bad news to their superiors (and, indeed, will often spin
the news in a positive fashion so as to please their superiors). See generally Donald C.
Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock
Market Investors (and Cause Other Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101 (1997).
There are at least two other dynamics that can also produce this silencing. One of them is
where those who have been promoted feel a sense of obligation to the organization for having
promoted them and, therefore, remain silent in the face of injustice. See KANTER, supra note 48,
at 229 (explaining how women demonstrate loyalty). The other relates to the perception of
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the presence of minority seniors would not necessarily exert any pressure on the
firm's decisionmakers to account for racial disparities or inequalities within the
firm.
D. Racial Cooperation
Earlier we posited that the presence of senior minorities would facilitate
racial cooperation. The notion was twofold. First, seniors would provide input
into the formation of teams to maximize opportunities for racial trust; and
second, their very success would eliminate or mitigate racial anxieties and
suggest to nonwhites and whites alike that racial cooperation is possible. 6
Here again the question is whether these theoretical benefits are realizable. The
short answer is only marginally so.
Minorities who survive promotion tournaments are not likely to be actively
engaged in race-conscious structuring of teams. Their firm socialization would
suggest to them that, both normatively and pragmatically, this is a bad thing to
do. It would render their own racial identities more salient and less palatable-
in other words, weaken their institutional fit. Further, to the extent that these
seniors have worked hard without the intervention of others to demonstrate
their capacity for racial cooperation, they may expect other minorities to do the
same.
the institution as a just, fair, or meritocratic place. Research shows that those who hold these
"just world" beliefs are less likely to perceive discrimination. See Cheryl R. Kaiser, Dominant
Ideology Threat and the Interpersonal Consequences of Attributions to Discrimination, in
STIGMA AND GROUP INEQUALITY: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES (C. van Laar & S. Levin
eds., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 11-12, on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review) (discussing the "study examining individual differences in chronic endorsement of the
[Belief in a Just World]"); Brenda Major & Cheryl R. Kaiser, Perceiving and Claiming
Discrimination, in THE HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (L.B. Nielsen & R. Nelson
eds., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 13-15, on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review) (examining the "[b]elief systems that justify hierarchical and unequal relationships
among groups in society"). Conversely, research also suggests that outsiders who attribute
negative events to discrimination, even when those events are blatant, are likely to be perceived
as troublemakers, that is, hypersensitive and irritating). See Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller,
Derogating the Victim: The Interpersonal Consequences of Blaming Events on Discrimination,
6 GROUP PRocESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 227, 234-36 (2003) (discussing results of experiment).
Given the foregoing, it seems reasonable to predict that an institution will have an interest
in promoting those who both feel grateful to the institution for promoting them and those who
perceive the institution as meritocratic and fair. These individuals, after all, are going to be less
likely than others to perceive discrimination.
76. See supra Part II.D (explaining the concept of racial cooperation).
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Nevertheless, there will probably be some marginal racial cooperation
payoff from the presence of successful senior minorities. Their presence will
suggest that people of color-of a particular type--can work cooperatively with
whites. To the extent their presence conveys this message, it is unlikely that the
firm's decisionmakers will adopt a per se position that people of color are
incapable of working cooperatively with whites. Instead, they are likely to have
a presumption against this possibility which could be rebutted to the extent that
the nonwhites in question are of the same racial type as the ones who survived
the promotion tournaments. This is the sense in which the racial cooperation
payoff from the presence of successful senior nonwhites is likely to be
marginal.
E. Racial Comfort
A related assumption we made about the benefits of senior people of color
in predominantly white corporate cultures is that they will reduce the supply of
and demand for racial comfort work. The thinking was that the presence of
senior people of color would diminish anxieties about racial difference, thus
reducing the need for juniors to supply racial palatability.
7
Just the opposite may be true, however. Recall our suggestion that
minorities who succeed in climbing the corporate hierarchy will probably have
performed individually centered stereotype negation strategies-that is,
strategies that reduce the extent to which the firm's decisionmakers will apply
racial stereotypes to them.78 These strategies do not challenge racial stereotypes
generally but rather challenge their applicability to particular individuals.
Consequently, even with the presence of seniors who survived several
promotion tournaments, the firm's decisionmakers will still base their hiring
and promotion decisions on the idea that, as a general matter, racial differences
cause grit not grease. They will thus continue to scrutinize junior minorities for
their capacity to supply grease-that is to say, comfort. The greater the
presence of racial comfort at the senior level, the greater the expectation that
racial comfort should be supplied at the junior level. Keep in mind that, for
efficiency reasons, there is already an incentive for the firm to achieve
sameness. 79 As we discuss elsewhere, to the extent possible, firms will want
to realize the efficiency gains of sameness while maintaining some
77. See supra Part Ml.E (discussing racial comfort).
78. See supra Part IV.A.2 (explaining individual negation strategies).
79. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 19, at 1788-1802 (discussing the homogeneity
incentive).
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degree of racial diversity.80 The success of racially palatable seniors creates
racial precedent for what one might call skin-deep racial diversity; diversity
that, in terms of identity performance, does little to disrupt or to contest the
institutional and white-privileging norms of the firm. Rather than reducing the
demand for racial comfort then, the presence of successful minorities might
actually increase it.
F. Role Modeling
Our assumption about role modeling was that the presence of people of color
at the top of the corporation would send a message to people of color at the
bottom that they can have a successful place at the top. But once we particularize
the discussion so that we are no longer discussing the generic category "people of
color" and the simple fact of racial presence but discussing instead racial types
and racial performance, it becomes less clear that the people of color at the top of
the corporation will function as racial models for the people of color on the
bottom. Part of what we have suggested is that the nonwhites who make it to the
top of the corporation are likely to be racially palatable. Thus, they will not have
evidenced an institutional identity that signifies racial group connectedness or
affinity. Indeed, there are incentives for the successful racial types (again, the
racial minorities at the top of the corporate hierarchy) to practice disassociation,
disidentification, and differentiation.8' In other words, there are incentives for
them to perform individual stereotype negation strategies to signal that they are
not like, and do not wish to associate with, other racial minorities. To the extent
that these strategies are performed, the people at the bottom of the corporation are
not likely to have a racial connection with or to experience a role model effect
from those at the top.
The foregoing argument assumes that the minorities at the bottom of the
corporation will be racially invested in forging a racial connection with those at
the top. However, this may not be the case, particularly if the corporation is
successful in screening for racial palatability. The more successful the
corporation is at performing this screening, the less likely that there will be racial
tension or disconnection between the people of color at the top of the corporation
and those on the bottom. Concretely, if Marco, a junior Latino executive, was the
product of the corporation's successful screening for racial palatability, he
80. Id.
81. See Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 76,
116 (2000) (referring to disassociation, disidentification, and differentiation as the "the politics
of the 3Ds").
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will probably not be concerned that Pablo (who goes by Paul) does not seem to be
interested in or motivated by racial group affinity. Indeed, Marco might
experience Paul as a role model precisely because Paul lacks this kind of racial
investment. Thus, there is quite possibly a role model signal that derives from the
presence of successful racial types. But the message this signal conveys is not
about the success of racial difference but rather the success of racial palatability.
G. Tokenism
With respect to tokenism, our assumption was that minority survivors of
the promotion tournament are likely to reduce the costs of tokenism-the
weight of representing one's race and a diminishment in one's sense of
workplace autonomy and belonging.8 2 Once again, there is reason to question
this assumption. Consider first the burden of racial representation. Assume
once more that Marco has just been promoted to the partnership. If one of
the reasons the partners promoted Marco is that they perceived him to be
different from other Latinos, his presence will do little to reduce the racial
representation burden of junior Latinos. They too will have to prove that
they are not like other Latinos, and they assume the risk that their job
performance and overall institutional identity will suggest that they are. In
other words, precisely because Marco's promotion was based, at least in part,
on racial exceptionalism, other Latinos will have to prove either that they,
like Marco, are exceptional or that racial stereotypes about Latinos are
inaccurate. Marco's success, therefore, will not necessarily ameliorate the
racial representation burdens of junior Latinos.
Nor is Marco's success likely to increase the workplace autonomy or
sense of belonging of junior Latinos. To the extent that juniors will
continue to worry about stereotypes and, more specifically, experience
pressure to repudiate them, their autonomy to navigate the workplace is
circumscribed. This is because the freedom junior Latinos have vis-A-vis
their workplace interactions is a function of their sense that they are subject
to negative racial stereotypes. The stronger this sense, the weaker their
workplace autonomy. Marco's status as a racial exception affects this
dynamic. Paradoxically, the more entrenched the fum's perception of Marco
as a racial exception, the heavier the burden on junior Latinos to repudiate
negative stereotypes. The racial logic of this dynamic derives from the
82. See supra Part II.F (discussing tokenism).
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simple notion that, by definition, exceptions are not the norm. The firm's
decisionmakers could conclude that if Marco is the exception, the others are
not. To make this more concrete, if in addition to Marco, there are two other
Latinos at the firm, the firm's decisionmakers would be asking themselves:
How likely is it that we have three racially exceptional Latinos working for
us? The fewer the number of junior Latinos, the stronger the firm's
impression that if Marco is a racial exception, the others are not. In this way,
Marco's perceived exceptionalism might actually decrease rather than
increase the workplace autonomy of junior Latinos. Because of his
exceptionalism, juniors will have to structure their workplace interactions to
rebut the presumption that, unlike Marco, they are not racial exceptions.
H. Mentorship
As discussed earlier, the first few generations of successful minorities
likely had trouble finding mentors; people who would transfer to them not only
the tacit knowledge required to excel at their jobs, but also an understanding of
the informal norms and politics of the workplace essential for institutional
survival and advancement.8 3 But how likely is it that those who made it despite
the lack of mentorship will mentor successive generations?
At least two of the characteristics of successful racial types suggest that the
answer is "not very likely": overconfidence and the need to demonstrate
affinity for the dominant group. Consider overconfidence. A successful racial
type likely has a firm belief that he deserves his success and that it was not a
product of chance or circumstance. 84 This overconfidence enables the minority
who uses high-risk strategies to succeed and to persuade others that his success
was not the product of chance but of merit. The problem this overconfidence
presents with respect to mentoring is this: a person of color who succeeds
without mentoring may believe that other minorities do not or should not need
any mentorship; after all, he made it on his own merit. He may even construe
affirmative mentoring as "special help," help that could function to confirm the
very stereotypes he spent much of his time attempting to disrupt.
83. See supra Part H.G (discussing mentorship and the network of information).
84. See Anderson, supra note 68, at 12 ("For... blacks [at the higher status levels of an
organization] there is a strongly felt need to believe they are present in the organization not
solely because of the color of their skin but because of their own excellence in the general
business world.").
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The second dynamic that cuts against mentorship is the need for the
successful minority to continually demonstrate that she is a team player.
Sharing her human capital with other minorities might suggest that she is a
racial group or special interest player. If the senior minority perceives that her
colleagues are scrutinizing her mentorship choices for signs of racially specific
mentorship, she may consciously seek to avoid mentoring too many or, indeed,
any minorities.
A final reason why senior minorities might not mentor juniors derives
from the investment on the part of seniors in continued corporate success. If a
senior perceives that minority juniors have a poor success rate, and if having a
stable of successful mentees is important to one's long term success, there is a
disincentive for the senior person of color to mentor junior nonwhites.
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V. Conclusion
We began our Article with a particular construction of workplace hierarchy.
Central to this construction is the idea that an employee's ability to race to the top
of the corporation is not solely a function of traditional qualifications and
capability. In other words, producing more widgets than one's competitors is not
enough. To succeed, employees have to effectively negotiate the political
landscape of the institution. That is to say, they have to appease individual
corporate officers, co-opt and make allies with powerful interest groups, and
undermine competitors. The more bureaucratic the organization and the more
opaque the promotion process, the more important this institutional game is to
climbing the corporate ladder.
Broadly stated, our aim has been to identify the kind of racial types who
are likely to play this game well and, consequently, race to the top of the
corporation. Our thinking was that, because the racial minorities at the top of
the corporation are in an institutional position to perform discrimination-
85. The phenomenon of inadequate mentorship by outgroup members has been observed
at length in the literature on gender. See Mizrahi, supra note 73, at 1590-92 (examining the
phenomenon of "female-on-female workplace hostility"). More broadly, see generally PAT
HEIM & SUSAN MURPHY, IN THE COMPANY OF WOMEN: TURNING WORKPLACE CONFLICT INTO
POWERFUL ALLIANCES (2001). Research by scholars such as Ely and Thomas, however,
suggests that there is nothing necessary about this dynamic. See generally Ely and Thomas,
Cultural Diversity at Work, supra note 63. Organizations can be structured in ways that women
(and other outsiders) are comfortable enough in their difference that they are able to help others
of their group. See Ely, The Effects of Organizational Demographics, supra note 70, at 206
("In settings in which women can perceive their group favorably relative to men, as when there
is evidence of women's advancement, women's identifying with women will be a positive
experience and can serve to strengthen relationships among them.").
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ameliorative tasks for those on the bottom, identifying these racial types is
crucial to making corporations more welcoming to, and comfortable for, racial
minorities. It is this intuition that helps to explain why many corporate
governance and employment discrimination scholars rest some of their hope for
the establishment of colorblind corporate cultures on the assumption that
successful racial types will actively seek out and perform antidiscriminatory
institutional work.
As we have shown, however, there is reason to believe that the racial
minorities at the top of the corporate hierarchy will neither racially reform the
corporation, nor engage in door-opening activities, for the minorities on the
bottom. Indeed, strong incentives exist for minorities to race to the top of the
corporation and pull the ladder up behind them when they get there. Our project
has been to set forth the nature of these incentives, reveal how they help to
produce particular racial types, and explain why these racial types might not have
the racial commitment, or feel institutionally empowered, to lift as they climb.
The question now is: What does the foregoing have to do with law?
Antidiscrimination law, for the most part, is structured to protect individuals from
intentional animus. But, as many have pointed out, much discrimination operates
beneath the surface, at the subconscious and unconscious levels.86 Despite this
shortfall in the law's coverage, there is an optimistic narrative that one can tell:
The imposition of barriers against explicit exclusionary practices, along with
changes in social norms regarding the unacceptability of intentional animus,
means that at least some racial minorities will be allowed into the executive suite.
The success and presence of these few in positions of power will result in cross-
racial learning and appreciation and, eventually, will lead to the amelioration of
unconscious and subconscious discrimination. At the same time, the people of
color at the top of the corporation will extend the corporate ladder to those at the
bottom.
The combined effect of these dynamics is greater corporate diversity. If one
adds to this corporate diversity story the standard economic narrative that the
market will drive out racist corporate conduct (racism is inefficient), one could
reasonably conclude that there need not be an antiracist rush to change the legal
standards and evidentiary burdens of employment discrimination law.
Our preliminary examination of (1) the types of racial minorities likely to
climb the corporate ladder, (2) the racial conditions of their climb, and (3) what
they do when they arrive at the top, suggest that, perhaps more than ever, law is
86. The classic articulation of the thesis is Lawrence, The Id, supra note 24; Krieger,
supra note 24.
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needed. Successful senior minorities cannot be expected to do the
antidiscrimination work that law, albeit imperfectly, has historically performed.
The difficulty is in articulating a coherent antidiscrimination theory to doctrinally
manage the problems of homogeneity, racial palatability, and negative
stereotyping.8 7 For unless we change the racial terms and conditions upon which
people of color race up the corporate ladder, we cannot but expect them to pull
the ladder away when they arrive at the top.
That cynical and skeptical note takes us back to whence we began--to the
lives of Jerome Culp and Marilyn Yarborough. The stories of their lives, ones
that we hope their colleagues and friends will document in detail, is that the
portrait of minority success is so much more complicated and nuanced than the
one we have painted. There are those among the first generations of successes,
like Jerome and Marilyn, who transcended the desire for personal success and
instead sacrificed repeatedly for the welfare of others. They lifted many as they
climbed. We will remember them. We will continue to speak their names. And,
we will always miss them.
87. For a preliminary effort in that direction, see generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note
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